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PREFaCE 
At the close of the 64th Session of Congress on March 4, 1917, 
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, declared publically in 
an ill-considered outburst, "A little group of wilful men have rendered 
the great government of the United States helpless and contemptible. ul 
This was his immediate and violent reaction to the filibuster which 
ended the Congress and failed to grant him the autnority he requested 
for arming United States merchant ships. Wilson went on to arm the 
merchant ships by Presidential proclamation and the short period of 
United States "armed neutrality" came into being. The "overt" act was 
soon forthcoming and the United States on April 6, 1917, became an 
Associate Power in the war against Germany and Austria. 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss and evaluate the political 
factors concerning the arming of the merchant ships and the filibuster. 
Why did the small group, led by the controversial Senator LaFollette of 
Wisconsin, thwart the will of the great majority of the Senate? What 
did they hope to accomplish? i'ihat was their purpose? What were the 
political factors involved? What was the reaction of the common people 
of the United States? Was this group right? These are some of the 
elements that I have attempted to include in my discussion of the attempt 
to get Congressional approval for the arming of American merchant ships 
when Germany announced her campaign of unrestricted warfare against the 
shipping of the world. Attempt is made, at all times, to consider the 
factors within a Political Science framework and to analyze cause and 
1T. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 643. 
iii 
effect rather than give a recounting of the happenings. The first and 
last chapters are generally historical but it is felt that this is 
necessary in order to give a complete picture of the happenings of forty 
years ago. The heart of the thesis is chapter three and accordingly a 
majority of the time and effort was devoted to that chapter. 
In ~ bibliography, I have tried to include all materials to which 
specific reference is made in the text of the work. Many excellent works 
that were useful in the formation of the background for the paper are not 
included. Special dependence has been placed upon the Congressional Hecord 
and, to a lesser degree, the New York Times. The many periodicals read and 
studied and many of the books contain the emotions of partisanship. They 
do indicate what the leaders of public opinion were thinking and provided 
very interesting reading. Several of the "revisionist" books of tne inter-
war period were included in order to get the viewpoint of these "why" after-
the-event writers. Attempt was made to analyze both sides objectively (if 
that is ever possible) and to present both sides of the controversy. In 
~ research, I was unable to find any book or periodical which specifically 
dealt with the happening. 
In the quotations, there are some minor grammatical technicalities 
that are incorrect. However, I have not made corrections, because I 
preferred a strict exactness of quotation even at tne cost of sacrificing 
grammatical perfection. 
I want to thank Doctor Hubert S. Gibbs, Chairman of tne Department 
of Government of Boston University, for his aid in planning this thesis 
and suggestions for form and subject matter. 
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CHAPTER I 
FACTORS INFLUENCING al'lliililCAN CONGllESSlONAL AC'llON 
AND PUBLIC OPINION, AUGUST 1914 TO fEBRDAJ.l.Y 26, 1917 
The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo, 
June 28, 1914, created only a flury of excitement in the United States.l 
Wnen it then became evident that Europe was being sucked into tne terrible 
vortex of war, the American people were greatly relieved and tnanked God 
for having the good sense to have made the atlantic Ocean and to have 
placed it between North America and Europe. The Literary Digest thus 
summed up newspaper reaction: "Our isolated position and freedom from 
entangling alliances inspires our press with t!:e cheering assurance that 
we are in no peril of oeinr, drawn into tne European quarrel. 11 2 America 
felt strong, smug, and secure. 
Among all the conflicting opinion about tne immediate circumstances 
tnat precipitated that conflict, one thing is historically certain: the 
United States was the only great power completely disassociated from the 
controversies which led to tile outbreak of tne war. Nei tner the people of 
the United States nor tne persons whom they had placed in governance knew 
very well what it was all about. This included the diplomats, several of 
them literary personages, most of the other political personages, newly 
installed in tile principal capitals of Europe by the incoming iVilson 
Administration.3 President Wilson promptly proclaimed American neutrality 
and requested the American people to be neutral in thought as well as action. 
lc. C. Tans ill, America Goes to War, p. 17. 
2Literary Digest, August 15, 1914, p. 260. 
3s. F. Bemis, ~Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 590. 
l 
All leaders of American life at the commencement of ti1e holocaust were 
in favor of the President's position. 
THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 
International law, as regards the seas, was in an uncertain state when 
the war broke out in 1914. There had been no great maritime war for one 
hundred years and the important developments had been the Declaration of 
1856 (following the Crimean War), the accepted Civil War practice of the 
United States, and tne Declaration of London of February 26, 1909. 
The Declaration of London constituted the best statement of maritime 
laws as they stood in 1914 and marked the high tide of liberalizing these 
laws. In attendence at this conference were Germany, Austria, Spain, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the Netherlands. Items 
discussed were blockades, contraband, resistance to search, compensation, 
etc.l A code was drawn up and was acceptable to most countries including 
the United States and Germany. Great Britain refused to racify it as the 
House of Lords considered it too favorable to neutral commerce--a considera-
tion which had prompted Germany to accept it. When Great Britain rejected 
the Declaration, the President of the United States withheld final rati-
fication.2 
The early British modifications of international law, to suit their 
own purposes and aid in the enforcement of tneir blockade, caused considerable 
hard feeling and anger in the United States. The Britisn interception of 
American ships and their actions in regard to contraband and their liberties 
in regard to visit and search were considered as detrimental to American 
rights. American ships were forced to detour into British ports and be 
lJ. B. Scott, The Declaration of London, ~'ebruary 26, 1909, p. 160. 
2op. cit., Note 1, p. 596. 
2 
searched due to the German submarine menace. Tnis often caused loss to 
American owners and frequently operated to tne advantage of their 
British competitors. In liliay, 1915, the British-born Secretary of "the 
Interior, Franklin K. Lane, exploded: 
'fhere isn1 t a man in the Cabinet who has a drop of 
German blood in his veins, I guess. Two of us were born 
under the British flag. I have two cousins in the British 
army, and Mrs. Lane has three. • • Yet each day that we 
meet we boil over somewhat, at the foolish manner in which 
England acts. Can it be that she is trying to take advan-
tage of the war to hamper our trade?l 
The British blacklist of July 1916 which forbade their subjects to do 
business witn some 85 American firms was very irritating to Americans. 
This anti-British feeling resulted in Congress giving the President re-
taliatory powers and aided the passage of the Naval Appropriations Bill of 
1916. 2 The British blockade produced another practice--opening of Ameri-
can mail--which proved particularly obnoxious to the people of the United 
States. In later years, Colonel House stated, doubtless witn exaggeration, 
that if it had not been for the more serious offenses of Germany in her 
submarine warfare it would have been well-nigh impossible to avoid hostili-
ties with Great Britain. 
PRQ-ALLIED INFLUENCING FACTORS 
At the beginning of the war the great majority of Americans wanted 
to stay neutral although on the whole their sympathies lay on the side of 
Great Britain, France and their Allies, and against GernBny and Austria 
and the other Central Powers. The wealthy and well educated could not 
forget their cultural heritage and Anglo-Saxon blood. They admired the 
lT. A. Bailey, !!; Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 617. 
2c. Seymour, House Papers, II, p. 311. 
3 
institutions of England and France and did not like Germany whose 
Frussian institutions they distrusted. Russia being in the picture did not 
effectively spoil the essential dualism of rigt1t and wrong. After almost 
a century of Anglophobia and tail twisting, relations with Great Britain 
had been good, particularly after the Venezuelan blowup of 1895-1896 and 
the repeal of the canal tolls.l There was also great enthusiasm for France 
and the debt owed to that country by the United States. The jingle from 
the pen of Robert Underwood Johnson came: 
Forget us, God, if we forget 
The sacred sword of Lafayette~2 
The economic factors which drew the nation to the Allied side con-
tributed greatly to the final Fro-Allied influences. Before the war in 
Europe in 1914, foreign trade had been fairly evenly distributed among 
the great importing nations of Europe. This distribution was upset by the 
war's outbreak. Great Britain's blockade reduced our trade with her 
enemies to aln~st nothing. In addition, the Allies themselves needed vast 
amounts of materials from America. The following cnart indicates the re-
sult quite c1early:3 
Percentage of United States Exports to: 
Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
1913 
13.45 
').93 
24.22 
1914 
14.58 
6.76 
25.13 
1915 
1.04 
13.34 
32.93 
1916 
.01 
14.50 
35.24 
1917 
.04 
16.09 
32.54 
lT. A. Bailey, ~ Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 612. 
2Ibid., p. 612. 
3united States ioreign Commerce iteports, 1913-1917. 
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In the year 1916, the United States broke all existing trade records 
and became the world's greatest buyer and seller. ~xports reached 
;P5,4Bl,OOO,OOO, which was far and away a new record. this showed a gain 
of $1,926,000,000 over 1915 and an increase of 'P2,997,000,000 over 1913. 
Within the United States, tne business of United States Steel in 1916 showed 
a profit of ~333,625,000 and a total business roore than twice the best 
previous year.l Allied war orders alleviated a serious depression in the 
United States and launched a period of unprecidented prosperity. 
The decision to permit the floating of loans on behalf of the Allies 
was a potent Pro-Allied influencing factor. At tne start of the war, 
President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan opposed loans but Wilson soon 
sanctioned and encouraged loans to the Allied belligerents. By the time 
the United States had entered the war, ~~rican private bankers had loaned 
$2,300,000,000 to the Allies in cash and credit and only ~27,000,000 to 
Germany .2 Speaking for the House of Morgan, Thomas VI. Lamont later de-
clared: 
From the very start we did everything we could to 
contribute to the cause of the Allies.3 
While British propaganda has been much ·naligned by tne revisionist 
writers and others as a primary reason for getting the \Jnited States into 
<vorld Nar I, there is still doubt of its effect. Jllllerican opinion was 
somewhat anti-German before the war began ana was rendered cnore so by 
German acts. 1he invasion of Belgium and tne sinking of shipping such as 
the Lusitania outraged American opinion. 'l'ne Britisn propaganda organization 
lcurrent History Magazine, New York Times, March, 1917, p. 1153. 
2T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the ..L11erican People, p. 622. 
3Ibid., p. 622. 
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embellished these acts and made the most of them. 'l'his was accomplished 
by seizing the Atlantic cable and censoring che news dispatches, and 
operating a well-developed propaganda organization in the United States. 
Almost without exception news stories were censored by tne English. The 
net result was that Americans ca.'ll8 to view the war largely tilrougn Allied 
glasses.l 
Tne British used their propaganda organization in tne Cnited States 
skil-lfully and effecti veJ.y. 'lney understood Anglo-Saxon psyciwlo•;y and with 
the advantage of a common language were quiet, discreet, cu1d efXective. 
'l'I1ey enlisted many influential Americans--tsachers, poii ticia.ns, journalists, 
etc., to tneir cause and tried to convince A.~n.ericans that England Yfas firht-
ing their fight. Among tne writers enlisted v1ere: James h;. BecK, ,John 
Burroughs, Julian Jay Chapman, Joseph Choate, Albert Bushnell Hart, and 
George Harvey.2 The Bryce heport had considerable effect due to the world 
wide reputation of the author. 
Another influencing factor on American public and con~ressional opinion 
was tne famous Zimmerman Note. This conrrnunication of January 16, 1917, 
instructed the German Minister in Mexico to propose to Mexico an alliance 
with the object of recovering tne "lost territories 11 of Texas, New Mexico, 
and Arizona in case the United States shouLd not remain neutral. ~~xico 
was asked also to invite Japanese adnerence co the plan.3 'l'he note was 
intercepted and deciphered by British authorities who turned it over to 
the American government. The authenticity of tne note was proven beyond 
all douot when the Foreign Secretary (Zimnerman) naively admitted the note 
lT. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of tne American Feople, p. 613. 
2w. Kniseley, A Stud~ of W"oodrow Wilson's and Senator LaFollette's 
Speaking £:!.the World War ssue, p. 12. --
3s. F. Bemis, ~ Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 613. 
6 
" was authentic. This note was even more repulsive to President Wilson when 
it became knovm that use of American diplomatic cornmunica-cion facilities, 
made available to the German Ambassador to the United States as a courtesy, 
had been used to transmit t11e note to Mexico. This was probably the most 
stupid diplomatic blunder of the entire war period, according to Ray 
Stannard Baker in his treatise on the affair.l A tremendous wave of anti-
German sentiment swept the country, especially in the Southwest and oVest 
Coast. 
GERMAN SUBlviARINE WARFARE 
On ~'ebruary 4, 1915, Germany announced that it would establish a 
war area around the British Isles and would atternut to destroy any ships 
found within that area. The official announcement declared tnat this 
drastic step had been made necessary as a result of Allied attempts to starve 
out Germany by iilegal practices, and that these practices had been acqui-
esced in by the neutral powers (including the united Sta-ces).2 
The legality of this action, by the German government, has been the 
subject of much analysis by the historians of the \Vorld Nar period. As 
the submarine was a new development, its use in vrartime had not been con-
sidered by international conferences as had tne longer established instru-
ments of naval warfare. Its peculiar technical nature gave it special 
effectiveness and imposed limitations on its use. The submarine was vul-
nerable to the guns of an enemy ship and of prime value as in instrument 
of war only when it could torpedo a ship from a submerged position or 
lR. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 0 p. 474. 
2T. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic HistOI"'J of -che American People, p. 624. 
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when its commander could be sure that the ship was not armed. The 
Government of the United States, from the first, considered such action 
contrary to international law.l Germany contended that the submarine 
campaign was justified as a retaliation for the Allied blockade which 
was starving her population. 
Very soon after the opening of the submarine campaign American citizens 
traveling in the "war zone" were affected. On February 22, 1915, the Brit-
ish ship Falaba was sunk after a twenty-three minu-ce warning with the loss 
of one American life. This was the first instance in which an Ainerican 
citizen was killed as a result of German submarine activity. On April 28, 
the American steamer Cushing was sunk and on May l, another American ship, 
the Gulflight, was torpedoed. Before much American action in protest was 
taken, the Lusitania was sunk on May 7, witn 128 Americans including 37 
women and 21 children being lost.2 
The circumstances surrounding the Lusitania sinking were of a highly 
controversial nature. Tne day before the ship sailed the German govern-
ment had placed an advertisement in several New York newspapers warning 
American citizens not to book passage. The Germans charged that it carried 
ammunition and explosives and that it was armed. The British government 
denied these charges. Tansill cites the report of the New York Harbor 
Authority which stated the amount and types of armnunition carried on the 
last trip of the Lusitania.3 
The sinking of the Lusitania had a great effect upon i\o11erican public 
opinion and feeling. One authority said: "Germany paid for it with the 
ls. F. Bemis, !!:_Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 601. 
2Ibid., p. 6 04. 
3c. c. Tansill, America Goes to War, p. 282. 
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loss of a war.ul The immediate feeling was reflected in the Des Moines 
(Iowa) Register and Leader in an editorial which began: "The sinking of 
the Lusitania was deliberate murder•~2 The New York Times demanded that 
"The Germans no longer make war like savages drunk witn blood."3 l'he 
United States protested to Germany in a series of notes which were strong 
and to the point. The incumbent Secretary of State, William Jennings 
Bryan, resigned over the second of these notes and Robert Lansing became 
the Secretary of State. Germany, as a result of tnese protests and the 
further protests over tne sinking of the British passenger st1ip Arabic, 
promised to abandon the practice of sinking on sight any st1ips in the 
"war zone" unless they resisted or tried to escape.4 
On March 24, 1916, an unarmed French passenger ship, the Sussex, 
was torpedoed by a German submarine, with heavy loss of life and serious 
injury to several Americans. This attack was unquestionably a violation 
of the German pledge not to sink unresisting passenger liners without 
warning. Secretary of State Lansing's note to Berlin of April 18, 1918, 
stated: 
Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately 
declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of 
submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying 
vessels, the Government of the United States can have no 
choice but to sever diplomatic relations .5 
Germany replied to this note and acceded to the American demands but with 
the string attached that other belligerents must respect the "laws of 
lMark Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 107. 
2Ibid., p. 120. 
3New York Times, May 15, 1915. 
4r. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 630. 
5rbid., p. 634. 
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humanity." This would have required the British to have relaxed its 
blockade of Germany. In the second message the American reply rejected 
the concession and the Germans were maneuvered into an unconditional 
acceptance of the American demands.l 
The Sussex pledge held good until the German government announced 
on January Jl, 1917, its unrestricted submarine campaign. Henceforth 
U-boat commanders would attempt to sink all ships--neutral or belligerent, 
passenger or merchant--in the specified zone. The United States was to 
be allowed to send one passenger vessel a week to Falmouth, England, under 
conditions which were insulting to a great nation. This was aptly de-
scribed by John Bach Mc~aster as follows: 
Our country has now received its orders. Once each 
week one passenger steamship, striped like a barber's pole, 
and flying at each masthead a flag resembling a kitchen 
tablecloth, might leave one port of the United States, 
making its way along a prescribed course, enter a speci-
fied port in England on a Sabbath day, or be sunk without 
warning. Had the German armies been in possession of every 
foot of our soil from the Atlantic to the Pacific, these 
orders could not have been more tyrannical.2 
The violation of the Sussex pledge by Germany left the United States 
with no recourse consistent with national honor and previous steps except 
to break relations with Germany. Accordingly, on February 3, 1917, 
President Wilson appeared before Congress and in a dramatic speech announced 
that diplomatic relations had been broken with Germany. 
lR. s. Baker, Vloodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 198. 
2Mark Sullivan, Our ·rimes, Vol. 5, p. 258. 
10 
PRO-GERMAN INFLUENCING FACTORS 
When the countries of Europe became engulfed in war in 1914, there 
were a great many population groups in the United States who were strongly 
pro-German. These were the hyphenated American groups of German-Americans, 
Irish-Americans, Austrian-Americans, Hungarian-americans, and some Jewish-
Americans. The German-Americans were tne largest group of this type in 
the United States and were largely congregated in tne isolationist mid-west 
areas. Of the 32,21J3,3B2 persons in tne United States who were foreign 
born or who had one or both parents born in Europe, about half CffiOO from 
the Central Powers.l These elements were naturally favorable to Germany 
and formed a strong ethnic minority for remaining neutral or aiding the 
Central Powers. These groups all began to take sides, organize, and to 
express themselves in foreign language newspapers. Tnis phenomenon caused 
many to wonder if the United States was not an international boarding 
house. 
There was a fairly strong group of pacifists in the United States in 
the early years of the war. After his resignation as Secretary of State, 
Willi&~ Jennings Bryan provided leadership and spokesmanship for the 
pacifists who had, in part, a common objective with the pro-Germans. 
Bryan addressed and provided inspiration for sucn groups as the German-
Alllerican Alliance, United Irish Societies, American Truth Society, 
American Independence Union, American Humanity League, Al!lerican Nomen 
of German Decent, and the German-American Peace Society.2 The position 
lr. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 611. 
2~~rk Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 160. 
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that Bryan took combined the attitudes of both pro-Germans and pacifists. 
This was to forbid Americans to travel on vessels oi' tne belli?,erents, to 
forbid A.Yfierican sflips to enter tile war zone, and to resist aj_l movements 
for preparedness. 
Other pacifists of note were Henry Ford, Jane Addams, Oswald Villars, 
Prof. George W. Kirchway of Columbia, Samuel S. kcClure, and Judge Sen. B. 
Lindsay .l Henry Ford and his "peace ship" tne Oscar II and his expensive 
but unsuccessful trin to ~urope to attem·.·;t to secure an end to tne holocaust 
were unique in history. 
Ger,tlan }Jropaganda haU sorn8 effect upon American pt:_-olj c o;·'·inion but 
in general was rather poorly handled. 'i·he GenndES tiid not ·aasically 
understand tne American psychology. 'l'hey 11ere cl.mnsy and often lost more 
than tne;v gained. Handicapped oy their own actions, sucn a.s che invasion 
of Belgium, the Germans never succeeded in really putting tlleir case 
across to the American people. Tney were often caug;~t in prooaganda acts 
or making indiscreet disclosures such as tnat of Capcain Von l'apen, 
German attache stationed in tne United States, wnen he 'Nrote nis wife, 
"I always say to -cnese idiotcic Yankees that they snould snut their 
mouths • 11 2 Certain German Alllericans such as George Syl ves-cer Vierick, wno 
conducted a weekly paper, I'he ~-atherland, tried to influence American 
thought in favor of Germany. N;any of these "ri ters pointed out tile kind-
liness of the German people, quoted their poets and poin-ced out their achieve-
ments in science. A sample ol' the German propaganda wnich appeared in 
1Mark Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 160. 
2New York Times, Current History lviagazine, p. 275. 
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the New York Post read as follows: 
Down with England'. Down with -che boot-licking 
kowtowing British hirelings in our press and our Ad-
ministration. • • Up and at tnem1• Enough of truck-
ling to their good graces, enough of asking for fair play. 
Up and at them'. Up you Americans who have not 
forgotten 1776 ••• Up you Poles, Hungarians, Austrians, 
Czechs, Germans, Irish, Swiss, Scandinavians, up every-
body, who stands for Old Glory first and all tne time, 
for his fatherland next and the rest of time ••• 1 
The early lack of success of Gennan propaganda may have partially 
accounted for the Germans turning to sedition and conspiracy against the 
United States. The fermenting of strikes, sabotaging of munitions plants, 
and other plots served to turn the American people and tne gre~t ~najority 
of government officials strongly against them during the years of American 
neutrality. 
GORE-McLEMORE RESOLUTIONS ON OCEAN TRAVEL OF AMERICANS 
During the latter part of 1915 and early 1916 there was consider-
able sentiment in Congress to bar Americans from traveling on belligerent 
ships and thereby prevent any happenings which might conceivably involve 
the United States in the European War. These ideas were supported by the 
pro-Gennans and pacifists. The chief spokesman, outside of Congress, was 
Williams Jennings Bryan, the ex-Secretary of State and three time loser 
as a presidential candidate. These sentiments reached tneir apex during 
the first session of the 64th Congress when resolutions were introduced 
in the House and Senate for this purpose. 1~hese resolutions constituted 
a direct challenge to the leadership of President Vfilson, interference in 
foreign affairs by the Congress, and a cha~lenge to his party leadersnip. 
1T. A. Bailey, ~Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 614. 
13 
They would have nullified the presidential policy based on international 
law which held that Americans had the right to travel on belligerent ships 
and to hold Germany responsible for the loss of any American lives due to 
her sub:narines. 
l'he first resolution was introduced into the House by Jeff i~cLemore 
of Texas, on February 17, 1916. It provided tnree main lines of at "Lack 
which were: (l) Forbid issuance of passports; (2) r'orbld clearance of 
armed vessels; (3) Warn passengers off belligerent ships.l President 
Wilson reacted immediately to tnis challenge to nis leadership. It seemed 
to arouse his fighting spirit.2 In a letter to Senator Stone, the Chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Helations Committee, he unequivocally stated 
his position as follows: 
For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgement 
of the right of American citizens in any respect. The 
honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. 'ile covet 
peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of 
honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for 
fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a 
deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but 
explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the riimts of 
mankind anywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. 
It would be a deliberate abdication oi' our hitherto proud 
position as spokesmen even amidst the turmoil of war for 
the law and tne rigi1t. It would make everytning this 
government has attempted and everything that it has achieved 
during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and 
futile.3 
On February 25, the day following President Wilson's letter to Sena-
tor Stone, another resolution was introduced into Congress, tnis time in 
the Senate by Senator 'l'homas D. Gore of Oklahoma. This resolution stated 
that American citizens should "forbear to exercise the right to travel 
1congressional Record, 64-1, p. 2756. 
2R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 167. 
3R. S. Baker and W. J;;. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, p. 123. 
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as passengers" on armed belligerent snips .1 At this time the sentiment in 
Congress seeJ~d to favor the passage of ootn these resolutions. President 
•Vilson decided he l!IUst know exactly where he stood and forced the issue 
by writing Representative E. W. Pou, then ra.'lking me:nber of the House Com-
mittee on Rules, asking for an early vote on the Gore and i~cLemore resolu-
tions so that our foreign relations might be cleared of damaging misunder-
standings.2 
The esteemed gentlemen on capitol hill failed to stand to the 
Presidential ultimatum and the downfall of the temporary revolt was swift 
and complete. The Senate tabled the Gore resolution of i~rch 23 by an 
overwhelming majority and the House did likewise with the McLemore resolu-
tion on March 7. 
!congressional Record, 64-l, p. 3120. 
2B.. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life ana Letters, Vol. 6, p. 173. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE STRUGGLE IN CONGRESS 
Following the breaking of relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, 
and the dismissal of tne German Ambassador Count von Bernstorf, there was 
a short interlude before the President made tne decision to go to Congress 
and ask authority to arm American merchantships. During this period there 
was tremendous pressure brought to bear upon Wilson to arm the ships. Two 
American snips, tne Housatonic and the Lyman ~· Law, had recently been sunk 
but these had ample warning and there was no loss of life. However, fear 
of Germany had in effect blockaded the entire eastern American seaboard. 
Ports were crowded with sllips riding at anchor. Business was slowing 
down. Ship-owners naturally declared it was the government's duty to 
protect, them. Great quantities of wheat and cotton were piling up and 
threatened to dislocate American economic life. '1'he mercnan-c snips would 
sail if che goverrwuent would give them arms and gun crews, make them, in 
the technical phrase, "armed merchant vessels."l 
The catinet of Wilson favored arming tne merchant ships and was 
nearer open revolt on this issue than at any other time during his adminis-
tration. Wilson was unwilling to go as far as the members of his cabinet. 
He seemed to believe that some of the members of the cabinet were bent 
upon pushing the country into war.2 Particularly vociferous were McAdoo, 
Lane, Houston, and Redfield, Secretaries of Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, 
and Commerce respectively. After a series of cabinet meetings, feelings 
lMark Sullivan, Our Times, Vol. 5, p. 263. 
2D. F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, p. 234. 
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became so heated that it was thought Houston and Mcadoo would resign from 
the Cabinet.l 
It is believed that iVilson was becoming convinced oi' the need for 
arming the merchantships when the Zimmerman note arrived at tne White 
House. vVilson was shocked and indignant. He could scarcely believe the 
disclosures concerning the proposed Mexican action should war break out 
between Germany and the united States. Ti-;is was ine clincher for the arm-
ing of the merchant ships and tne attempt at "armed neutrality." '!'inile 
the President believed he had tne necessary autnority by his constitutional 
duties and powers, he said, "I prefer in the present circumstances to feel 
that the power and auinority of Congress are benind me in whatever it lilay 
become necessary for me to do. "2 
~'<nile President Wilson was making up his mind about going to Congress 
on the arming of merchant ships, Senator rtobert LaFollette, of Nisconsin, 
who was destined to become his bi"tter antagonis-e on tne issue, was having 
premonitions concerning possible Administration ac-cions. Some days before 
l'dlson went to Congress, LaB'ollette nad sought to forestall the armin~ of 
ships by introducing a resolution in tne Congress. 'lnis Senate Joint 
Resolution (211) provided: 
That it shall be unlawful at a "time when the United 
States is not at war for any merchant vessel of the 
United States to be armed and to depJ.rt fro;n a port of 
the united States or any of its territories or possessions 
for a port of any otner country, its colonies, or 
possessions.) 
Tne resolution was reaci, tnen tabled. i"or 1_at3r consideration. 1'11e i11ew York 
ln. li'. Houston, Eigl1t Years ·with ·vVilson' s CaOinet, p. 239. 
2R. s. Baker, Woodrow IVilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 472. 
)Congressional rtecord, 61.;-2, D. 3064. 
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Times wrote that tne majority of Senators "were inclined to deplore the 
raising of the anned ships issue. nl 
At a joint session of the tvm Houses of Conc:ress on ~"ebruary 26, 1917, 
President Wilson requested to be authorized to supply our merchant snips 
with defensive arms. In his address, he saici in part: 
Our own commerce has suffered, is suffering, rather 
in apprehension that in fact, rather because so many of 
our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports than 
because American snips have been sunk. • • Two American 
vessels have been sunk, the Housatonic and the ~mat ~· 
Law. • • If our ships and our people are spare , l will 
oeoecause of fortunate circumstances or because the 
cormnanders of the German submarines wnich they may happen 
to encounter exercise an unexpected discretion and re-
straint rather than because of the instructions under 
wnich those commanders are acting. It would be foolish 
to deny that the situation is fraught with the gravest 
possibilities and dangers. No thoughtful man can fail to see 
that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, 
if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our 
elementary rights as a neutral nation ••• 
I cannot in such circumstances be un:nindful of the 
fact that the expiration of the term of the present 
Congress is immediately at hand, by constitutional limita-
tions; and it would in all likelihood require an unusual 
length of time to organize the Congress which is to succeed 
it. • • No doubt I already possess that autnority without 
special warrant of law by the plain implication of my 
constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in the 
present circumstances, not to act upon general implication. 
I wish to feel that the authority and power of Congress 
are behind me in whatever it may become necessary for me 
to do. • . • 
Since it has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard 
our right by diplomatic means against the unwarranted in-
fringements they are suffering at tne nands of Germany, 
tnere may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which 
we shall know how to maintain ana for wnich there is 
abundant American precedent •• 
War can come only by the wilful acts and aggressions 
of others ••• 
1New York Times, E'ebruary 24, 1917. 
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I request that you will authorize me to supply our 
merchant ships with defensive arms, snould that become 
necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ 
any other instrumentalities or methods that may be neces-
sary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in 
their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas. I 
request also that you will grant me at the same time, 
along with the powers I ask, a sufficient credit to en-
able me to provide adequate means of protection where 
they are lacking, including adequate insurance against 
the present war risks.l 
The address to Congress was well received by both Houses, Bills 
were shortly introduced into both branches of Congress to give the Presi-
dent the substantiating authority which he requested. At the beginning, 
it appeared that the measure would go through Congress with little or no 
opposition. 
ACTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
The request of the President was soon translated into action in the 
House of Representatives by the introduction of H. H. 21052 by Mr. Henry 
D. Flood of Virginia, Chairman of the Foreign !(elations Cornmi ttee. The 
bill was sent to conunittee where it was slightly revised on February 27 
and returned to the floor of the House on March 1. The bill provided 
essentially what the President had requested. In part it read: 
That the President of the United States be, and is 
hereby, authorized and empowered to supply merchant ships, 
the property of citizens of the United States and bearing 
American registry, with defensive arms, and also with the 
necessary ammunition and means of making use of them in 
defense against unlawful attack; and that he be and is 
hereby authorized and empowered to protect such ships 
and the citizens of the United States against unlawful 
attack while in a lawful and peaceful pursuit on the high 
seas.2 
1Messages and Papers of Woodrow 1iilson, heview of Reviews, P• 363-365. 
2Congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4682. 
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The additional portions of the bill dealt with tne appropriation of 
$lOO,OOO,llOO for insuring vessels against war risk and the selling of 
bonds to provide for tne raising of these funds. 
On March l, the House sat as a Committee of the linole to debate 
the arming of American merchant ships. Debate was limited to three hours 
with both sides getting one and a half hours time. The pro side was con-
trolled by Representative Flood the introducer of the bill, and the op-
position was led by Representative Henry A. Cooper of 'iiisconsin. 
The Congressmen in favor of the bill advanced many reasons for their 
support in the speeches during the debate. Among the various reasons they 
gave for their support were the following:l 
a, It was less likely to lead to war, 
b. The rights of Americans must be protected. 
c. The honor of America must be defended and protected, 
d. The country must unite bacK of tne President. 
e. lt is the patriotic tning to do. 
f. lie must uphold international law. 
g. We will lose national self-respect. 
h. The President already has the authority and this will show 
Congress is back of him. 
i, The commercial interests of America require support. 
The opponents of the bill were equally vociferous and attacked the 
bill vehemently on many points. The opponents expressed themselves to be 
against the arming for some of the reasons given oelow:2 
a. It was a declaration of war. 
b. Congress was relinquishing its powers. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4636-L69l. 
2roid., p. 4636-L69l. 
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c. Congress giving up its responsibilities. 
d. The people of the United States do not want war. 
e. Too much power would be given to the President. 
f. There was not enough time to properly debate the matter. 
g. The bill would aid profiteers and commercial enterprises. 
h. American food and resources should be kept at home. 
The Congressmen strongly favoring the bill and supporting it vigor-
ously were Flood, Virginia; Emerson, Ohio; Mann, Illinois; Henry, Texas; 
Kitchen, North Carolina; Foss, lllinois; Rogers, Massachusetts; Temple, 
Pennsylvania; Bennett, New York; and austin, Tennessee. In opposition 
to the bill were Cooper, '/lisconsin; Campbell, Kansas; Shackleford, lilissouri; 
King, Illinois; Deci<:er, Ivlissouri; Dillon, South Dakota; ana Helgeson, North 
Dakota. 
There were six attempts to amend the bill during the session on Jvlarch 1, 
1917. The nature of the more significant of these attempts to alter the 
bill are indicated below: 
That no ship of A.merican registry while armed in the 
manner aforesaid shall carry a cargo consisting in whole 
or in part of arms or ammunition consigned to a belligerent 
country. 
Nothing herein will be construed as a denial of the 
legitimate right of visit and search. 
That no passports shall be granted any ll.l!lerican 
citizen intending to take passage upon any ship bound for 
a foreign port and carrying arms or munitions of war.l 
These attempts were decisively beaten and the bill remained as introduced 
into the House. After the third reading, lllir. Cooper of iiisconsin offered 
1
congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4o89-469l. 
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a motion to recommit the bill to Connnittee. The vote was taken :md the 
motion beaten by 293 to 125 with 15 not voting.l 
After the attempt to recommit, the bill was brought to a vote and 
passed by the overwhelming margin of 403 to 14 with 17 not voting. 2 
THE EARLY STAGES IN THE SENATE 
Following the address of President 1/ilson to tne .ioint session of 
Congress, Senator Stone of Missouri, Chairman of the Senate Foreip,n riela-
tions Co~~ttee, moved that the address be referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. The next day, ~"ebruary 27, tne Senator introduced a 
bill (S. 8322) authorizing the President of the united States to sup~ly 
merchant ships with arms. The bill provided: 
That the com~anders and crews of all merchant 
vessels of the United States, and bearing the registry 
of the United States are hereby authorized to arm and 
defend such vessels against unlawful attacks, and the 
President of the United States is hereby authorized and 
empowered to supply such vessels with defensive arms, 
fore and aft, and also with the necessary ammunition and 
means of making use of them; and that he be, and is here-
by, authorized and empowered to employ such other instru-
mentalities and methods as may, in his judgment and 
discretion, seem necessary and adequace to protect such 
vessels and the citizens of the United States in their 
lawful and peaceful pursuits on the high seas.3 
Other features were that iilOO,OOO,OOO be appropriated for tne insurance 
element and bonds be sold to raise the necessary funds. It may be noted 
that the "other instrumentalities" clause was inserted in this bill as 
a change from that introduced in the House. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4691. 
2Ibid., p. 4692. 
3Ibid., p. 4399. 
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Senator LaFollette, obviously playing l'or time, objected to the 
second reading of the bill, an action which retarded it one day. During 
the argument which ensued, Mr. Natson asked if Mr. Stone might tell 
whether or not the bill was a unanimous report of the committee, but the 
latter refused to make any statement. Tne following day, Senator McCumber 
submitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute for Senate bill 8322. 
'['his e.mendment read as follows: 
I submit an amendment in nature of a substitute for 
Senate Bill 8322, authorizing the President to supply 
merchant ships with defensive arms and to employ such 
instrumentalities and methods as may, in his judgment 
and discretion, seem necessary and adequate to protect 
such vessels and the citizens of the unioed States in 
their peaceful pursuits on the high seas, and for other 
purposes, which I ask may be printed and lie on tne 
table .1 
The action requested in the amendment was taken. 
The parliamentary struggle began in earnest in tne early morning of 
l\larch 1, when shortly after midnight of the preceding day, liir. Stone moved 
for an adjournment with the end in view of securing consideracion of his 
bill. He hoped to secure "unanimous consent" for consideration of the 
bill and supported adjournment on tne basis tnat no other business except 
for nominations for reference and reports of nominations already received 
would be considered.2 lvir. Penrose moved tnat the Congress adjourn until 
ten-thirty that morning; Mr. LaFollette, ten o'clock; anci l<lr. Hitchcock, 
twelve-fifty-five of that morning. 'l'his last prouosal would give a recess 
of only ten minutes as it was then almost twelve-forty. After ohe Senate 
re-convened at tne time specified (twelve-fifty-five a.m.), Lai'ollette 
lcongressional rtecord, 64-2, p. li4d 3. 
2Ibid., p. 4400. 
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refused oo dispense witn the reading of the Journal until Mr. Stone promised 
tnat the bill would take its usual course, go -co co;a,aittee that <J,,.y, be 
reported back that day, and then go over to l"'lrch 2. Lar'ollette was ob-
viously trying to gain time in which to prepare for debate and possible 
defeat of the bill by filibuster. The procedure was followed and shortly 
l .. .tlereaft.er ttie Send.te took a recess untii ten tne next morning .1 
'l'he bill was tnus prevented from being considered until the norning 
of March 2. A unanimous consent to debate and vote uuon tile 11aval 
Appropriation bill, however caused JiJr. Stone's resolution to be set aside 
in the mornine: and held over until the ai'ternoon. SC!ortly after four 
o'clock on that afternoon, by a vote of seventy-seven to fourteen, the 
Senate proceeded to consider the bill. 
LaFOLLE'l"IE AtirtANGB;S A n1lbUS'lErt 
The obvious course for LaFollette and tnose working with him was 
to prevent the bill from coming to a vote. ciy the right of unlimited 
debate in the Senate, the bill could be talked to deach in tne closing 
hours of Congress. 'l'his was a role that fitted LaFollette exactly. His 
speeches were long and he could speak for hours without relief. He did not 
mind the disfavor which meets obstructionist tactics and liked tne atten-
tion of the country as a whole. He seemed, in tnis case, to be motivated 
by a sincere conviction that the bill would take the right to declare war 
from Congress and put it in the hands of the President in a thoroughly 
unconstitutional manner. He was ,joined in this filibuster by six Repub-
licans--Senators Norris, Nebraska; Kenyon, Iowa; Cummins, Iowa; Gronna, 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4565. 
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North Dakota; Clapp, Minnesota; and "orks, California--and five De:nocrats--
Stone, Missouri; O' Gorman, New York; Kir-oy, Arkansas; Lane, Oregon; and 
Vardaman, lviississippi.l 
Inasmuch as Senator Stone was not in accord with tl1e bill, Senator 
Hitchcock of Nebraska, the next ranking member oi' the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, took charge of the management of the measure. Mr. Stone, after 
relinquishing control of the measure, then tried to amend the bill to for-
bid the manning of guns, the carrying of muni-tions, and tne carrying of 
supplies to belligerents.2 The amenQments were never brought to a vote and 
would have been unquestionably defeated if they had. Senator Hitchcock 
made repeated attempts to bring the matter to a vote and at"Lempt to limit 
speeches. The only accomplisrunent was the enactment clause of the House 
bill (H. R. 21052) was substituted for tne enactment clause of the Senate 
bill. In the early morning ot March 3, at twelve-forty a.m., Senator Hitch-
cock compromised with tile unrelenting opposition when he agreed to a recess 
until ten a.m. of that day on tne condition that t11e bill be made unfinished 
business of the Senate. This compromise proved to be the beginning of the 
end for the Administration's proposal as it was later ascertained. The 
following remark from a memorandum of a conversation between Senator Norris 
and Mr. Harley a. Notter, made many years later is quoted: 
"We have got them beaten, 11 said Norris to LaFollette. 
"We can hold out now. We've enough speakers to filibuster 
from tomorrow on. 11 3 · 
The Senate reconvened at ten a.m. on March 3 on what was to be the 
last meeting of the 64th Congress. Mr. Hitchcock struggled to get a 
lR. S. Baker, and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
p. 434. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4745. 
3£(. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, p. 460. 
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unanimous agreement to vote on tne bill or limit speeches and each time 
was frustrated by one of the filibustering group. Senators Norris of 
Nebraska, and Cummins of Iowa, were constantly objecting. /\'hen Norris 
was accused of obstructionist tactics, he answered: 
I would not hesitate to kill the bill if I could. 
I nave already said I would be glad to kill it if I could. 
I do not know that I am even going to talk at all on it; 
but I object to having the debate run on for a couple of 
days by those who are in favor of the bill and then an 
effort be made to gag those who are oprosed to it. I am 
within Illlf right in objecting, and I do object to a limita-
tion of any kind,l 
Tentative hours suggested by Hitchcock, running all ti1e way from six in 
tne evening of March third to ten o'clock on the morning of !fJarcn fourth, 
were rejected. 
The filibuster was carefully planned in advance so that each of the 
Senators opposing the bill should speak on it, consu,ning as mucn time as 
possible. Thus Senator Stone occupied four hours. Senator Gronna spent 
an hour discussing rural problems in North Dakota. Senators ilorks, Norris, 
Cummins, and Clapp made long speeches with tne others helping out as needed. 
Senator Norris was later to write: 
I warned each member of the filibuster that he 
must be ready when the Senator who had the floor sur-
rendered it, and that he must immediately address the 
presiding officer. If we permitted a moment to elapse, 
the presiding officer would put the question, and the 
conference report would be agreed to,2 
The careful preparations continued to pay off as during tne long night of 
April 3 the measure was kept from coming to a vote. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4895. 
2M, Gross, The Legislative Struggle, p. 376. 
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RESOLUTION OF THE SEVENTY-FIVE 
At three thirty a.m. of March 4, the Senators supporting the bill 
presented a prepared manifesto which they had planned to issue to the 
public in case the few opponents of the bill succeeded in preventing a 
vote. Senator Hitchcock in making a statement when this was about to 
be introduced said: 
Therefore, at this hour, when the defeat of this 
measure by exasperating and procrastinating debate, 
simply for the purpose of delay, threatens to prevent 
Senators from going on record--at this hour, when that seems 
to be imminent, we propose by putting this statement in 
the Record to show that nine-tenths of the Senate are 
ready to vote and anxious to vote and want to vote for 
this bill, but tney are being prevented by 12 Senators, 
practically, of the Senate who refuse us an opportunity 
to vote. 'then the world will know that the Senate is 
with the President, as the House of Representatives was 
with the President, nine to one.l 
Following the statement, Senator Hitchcock yielded the floor to Senator 
Robinson of Arkansas, who introduced the following resolution: 
The undersigned United States Senators favor the 
passage of S. 8322, to authorize the President of the 
United States to arm ~~erican mercnant vessels and to 
protect American citizens in their peaceful pursuits 
upon the sea. A similar bill has already passed the 
House of Representacives by a vote of 403 to 13. Under 
the rules of tne Senate allowing debate witnout limit 
it now appears to be impossible to obtain a vote prior to 
noon, March 4, 1917, when the session of Congress expires. 
We desire tnis statement entered in tne Record to estab-
lish tne fact that the Senate favors the legislation and 
would pass it if a vote could be had,2 
The above was signed by seventy-five Senators at the time and was 
later to be signed by two more, Those not signing, except for tne twelve 
engaged in the filibuster, were absent from the Senate during the period 
due to health reasons or government business. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, P• 4988. 
2Ibid., p. 4988-4989. 
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There were some vociferous and vehement outcrys from the filibusterers 
upon the presentation and recording of the manifesto. Senators Clapp and 
Works were particularly eloquent in their denunciations of tne majority 
group for taking this method of making known their desires and pointing 
out the persons responsible for failing to provide the American merchant 
ships with the arms requested by the President. 
CONGRESS ADJOUrtNS 
Final attempts of the Senate leaders to secure a vote on the bill 
were as fruitless as the earlier ones. LaFollette was adamant and he had 
enough speakers on his side to carry through to the end of tne session. 
'Nhen it became evident that the filibuster would succeed in spite of the 
strong majority in favor of immediate vote and passage, the Administration 
faction planned their revenge. It was well known that LaFollette planned 
the most spectacular scene for the last few hours of one session when he 
should speak against the bill. They determined to prevent him. 
The closing hours of the Senate always provide the best audiences. 
The audience on the fourth of March was particul~rly to Mr. LaFollette's 
liking, declared the New York Times.l The galleries were filled and over-
flowing, while long lines waited outside in the hope of taking the place 
of those who might leave. Tile diplomatic group were occupying "the section 
reserved for them and were immensely amused at the strange spectacle of a 
few men defeating tne will of the great majority. LaFollette was in the 
height of his glory, quite unaware of any conspiracy to rob nim of nis hour 
of triumph. But when he sought recognition, it was denied. In angry 
lNew York Times, March 5, 1917. 
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indignation he protested. Senator Hitchcock refused to yield and toe Chair 
upheld him. LaFollette argued and fumed, but to no purpose. He interrupted, 
he objected, and even charged his opponent wit.n l'd.lsehooJ. The New York 
·1'imes described the scene with grim Immor: 
Towards eleven o1 clock on the las-e day of che session, 
LaFollette seemed beside himself with rage. He wore a fixed 
smile, and his eyes ·w·ere blazing, while his round face vvas 
turned to a deep red. His voice was high and harsh and 
screaming and he would bounce out of his seat and thrllst his 
jaw forward as he yelled at Hitchcock in an effort to drown 
out che Nebraskan's even tranquil voice; a..nd then he would 
laugh in a discordant, provocative voice and call over to 
the stenographer soli!e sentence he wanced tnern to take down 
though Hitchcock was still talking imperturbably away .l 
In the midst of Mr. hitchcock's remarks, at twelve o'clock noon, the Sixty-
fourth Congress expired.2 
Although prevented from making his speech before the Senate, LaFollette 
was determined to be heard. He wrote the New York Times setting forth his 
reasons for opposing the Armed ::>nip bill. These were as follows: 
1. The bill was unconstitutional for it gave tne President the 
right to make war. 
2. It was useless, for it seems impossible to fight the submarine 
with ordinary guns on board ship. 
3. It was not impartial, for if we mean to assert our rights 
by armed force, we should do so not only against Germany, 
but against England, "Which established tne first war 
zone in violation of international law. 11 
4. The bill was injected into Congress at tne last moment when 
urgent bills c~rrying enormous appropriations awaited 
consideration.j 
The reaction to the filibuster and the defeat of the President' s 
proposal to arm American merchant ships was violent in the nations press 
lNew York Times, March 5, 1917. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 5020. 
3New York Times, April 2, 1917. 
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and at the White House. Lafollette and nis Senate cohorts were castigated 
by most newspapers and by many of the nation's leaders. Some of che re-
sults and the effects of the action will be discussed in a later chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF THE STRUGGLE IN CONGRESS 
The defeat of the great ma,jority in Congress by a small minority 
electrified the United States and the world. The reaction in tne United 
States was iMnediate and violent. The filibusterers were called traitors, 
iscariots, lovers of rrussianism, delinquents, and many other equally 
unsavory names by the newspapers of the nation. Tne rresident was vehement 
in his denunciation of the 11li ttle group of wilful men." The Allies looked 
on rather cynically from Europe and wondered about the great democracy 
that was spawned across the sea. 'l'he only people happy witn the obstruc-
tionist tactics were the Central Powers and tne small group of pro-Germans 
and pacifists in the United States. 
In analyzing the bitter struggle, it may be well to consider some 
of the factors which were among the ingredients. Such items as party 
effect, sectionalism, pressure and ethnic groups, isolationism, inter-
ventionism, and the personality factor will be considered. The opinions 
and viewpoints of the opposing leaders will also oe examined to determine 
the effect they had on the struggle. What did the filibuster signify? 
~mat did the small group hope to gain by so obviously flaunting the will 
of the majority and jeopardizing their own political careers? v~nat did 
they hope to accomplish by this type of tactic? These, and other elements, 
must be considered in attempting to bring analytical clarity out of the 
chaos of the controversy. 
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PAtl.TY LINES 
The 64th Congress was elected to office in 1916 with Woodrow Wilson 
and the "he kept us out of war" slogan. ·rhis Congress was destined to be 
one of the most important in the history of the united States. At the 
start of the second session of this Congress, the majority belonged to 
the Democratic Party after the successful election of 1916. The majority 
was not excessive but was sufficient to give the Democrats the necessary 
control needed for their legislative programs. At the opening of the 
second session of the 64th Congress the parties in Congress stood as 
follows:l 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Progressives 
Progressive Republican 
Independent 
Socialist 
Prohibitionist 
Progressive-Protectionist 
Progressive-Democrat 
Total 
Senate 
55 
41 
96 
House of 
Representatives 
227 
199 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
435 
The Vice-President of the United States, who presided over the Senate, 
was Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana. The President Pro Tempore of the 
lcongressional Directory, 64-2, p. 195. 
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Senate was Williard Saulsbury of Delaware wnile -cne Speaker of the House 
was Champ Clark of ivJ.ssouri. The Democrats nad, in tne usual custom, 
organized both Houses of Congress and all tne important committees were 
chaired by Democrats,l 
The voting patterns in this Congress as far as the "party line" 
concept of normality goes were unusual, They were greatly effected by the 
war in Europe and as the war progressed the differences between the parties, 
as far as political philosophy and opposition party are concerned, became 
less and less. In the first years when neutrality was the watchword and 
President Wilson was talking in terms of "being too proud to fight," the 
Republicans were for preparedness and strong action against Germany while 
the President's party tended to follow his more moderate leadership. 
Henry Cabot Lodge was "the strongest and most interventionist minded of 
the Congressional leaders. However, ar'-cer Wilson came out for preparedness, 
the differences became less and less as far as party lines were concerned 
and other elements, such as sectionalism, isola-cionism, interventionism, 
and the personality factor exerted more influence on the actions of' 
individual Senators and Representatives. 
There was no evidence of the party factor having much to do with 
the controversy over arming American mercilant ships in either the Senate 
or the House. In -che vi trolic debate in the Senate on March 4, 1917, 
Senator Ollie P. James, a Democrat from Kentucky and one of the leaders 
of the Senate, in debating a point concerning tne "Manifesto of the 75, 11 
said: 
11The Senator speaks of the majority. There are no party 
lines in this figi1t, I rejoice -co say. The Senators who 
lcongressional Directory, 64-2, p. 163-193. 
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signed the statement constitute a majority of his mm 
party as they constitute a majority of our party. 111 
The same statement could have been made concerning the struggle in the 
House over the question. The New ~ Times Current History Magazine 
quoted Representative ~~lood of Virginia, the Chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs committee, and a leader in getting che bill passed: 
The passage of the bill in the House was marked by 
many patriotic addresses and a complete lack of parti-
zanship; the leaders of the Republican minority advocated 
the measure as enthusiastically as the Democratic leaders.2 
IVhile, of the Representatives voting against passage of the bill the majority 
were Republicans, this may be discounted because of the small numbers in-
volved and the apparent overiding elements of sectionalism and isolationism. 
Of the fourteen voting against the bill in the House, ten were Republicans, 
three were Democrats and one was Socialist. In the Senate, the party split 
was quite even. Aligned witn LaFollette in the filibuster were six Repub-
licans and five Democrats. 
While in a political struggle of any sort it is often dangerous and 
foolish to discount the party influence and effect, it can be said, with 
reasonable certainty, that party lines were almost non-existant in the 
armed ship controversy. There might have been some little element present 
at the start but this bore little weight in view of the stronger influences. 
SECTIONALISM 
When party unity breaks down the cause lS usually sectionalism.3 
This was generally true in the House and Senate during the controversy over 
Icongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4993. 
2New York Times Current History J~agazine, p. 50. 
3a. 1. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Poreign Policy, p. 14. 
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the arming of merchant ships and was one of tne most important considera-
tions in the defeat of tne bill in the Senate. Tile balance of che opposi-
tion came from the center of the country--the great farming areas which 
were far from the sea and tne effects of tide water. Ship building, 
foreign affairs, commerce and other elements which intimately tied the 
Eastern Coastal areas to tne war in Europe, were not paramount considera-
tions for the central Great Plains. Tne areas of the country--New England 
and North Atlantic, the South, Border States, Lake States, Great Plains, 
Rocky Mountains, and Pacific Coast--will be considered individually in 
analyzing the effect of sectionalism on the Congressional action. 
The support for arming the merchant snips was strongest in the New 
England and North Atlantic states in both parties and in both Houses of 
Congress. Some of the reasons were as follows: shipping and commercial 
interests, nearness to ~urope, the Anglo-Saxon heritage (possibly off-set 
by the Irish-Americans), the desire to protect American rights, tne 
desire to preserve international law, and the belief that the honor of the 
United States must be upheld. Two of the most influential Senate leaders 
who fought for the bill's passage during the controversy were Henry Cabot 
Lodge of Massachusetts, and Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut.l In the 
House of Representatives WilliamS. Bennett of New York, and John J. Rogers 
of Massachusetts, performed similar service for the Administration. 2 Among 
those in opposition to tne bill, there could only be found two from both 
Houses of Congress. These were Senator Jarnes A. 01 Gorman of New York and 
Representative Meyer London of the same state. O'Gorman, in attempting 
lCongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4751, 4866. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4639, 4644. 
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to justify his vote, later said that he was not against tne bill but only 
the provision having to do with the arming of ships which rrdght carry 
munitions.l !Lepresentative London was the only Socialist in Congress 
and it rnight be said that his opposition could nave been anticipated and 
expected. 
Those who maintain that the Civil Vlar made the United States a united 
nation, one and inseparable, sometimes fail to mention that the eleven 
old Confederate States of America still form a socio-political unit. the 
Southern states' Congressional nepresentatives were almost unanimous in 
their support for President Wilson's bill. A great deal of this was pro-
bably~ the fact that they were all Democrats except for a few 
Congressmen who were elected from the outlying mountain districts of 
1'ennessee and North Carolina. Their main reasons for this supoort, 
other than party unit solidarity were: protection of United States 
commerce, upholding tne honor of the United States, uphol~ing interna-
tional law, against Ger:nar1 rnilitarism, patriotism, and generally a pro-
British attitude. John Sharpe ivillia,'Yls of 1•iississippi, was one of tne 
strongest supporters of the bill.2 The junior Senator fro;,, Kississippi, 
James K. Vardaman voted '"~ainst t11e bill and e1ppearsci to <:.e one of tne 
sincere pacifists in the manner of ·dillie:L·l Jermini!S 0ryan oi· vr.ilo;:l he was 
a disciple. Strong support for 1-.ae oill in -Lr;_e J.-:ovo·:J c · ·te j:ro:a itepresen-
tatives Henry D. Flood ol' Virginia, Claud" r\itcnen ol' ~:orth Carolina, 
Charles Stedrrtan of North Carolina, a_nQ J. 'Jhom.as Heflin oi' Alabama.3 
'i'he Border states of Kentucky, i,,aryland, ;;dssouri, Olkahorna, &'ld 
Vi est Virginia followed the Eastern seaboard in their attitude on the 
loutlook, March 14, 1917, p. 4h~. 
2congressional rlecord, 6~-2, p. 4991. 
3rbid., p. lr637, 4o46, 4651. 
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controversy althou:~h tne Congressional attitudes -vvere milder. Tfley seemed 
to generally decrease in activity and strenc;tn of support as Lney ;noved 
farther in toward the interior and away from tne coast. 'l'f1e issues raised 
by those favoring the bill were basically the sa"le as those of the Eastern 
groupings. These were for upholding international law, protection of com-
merce, upholding the honor of the united States, as some of the basic 
issues influencing this section. Senator Viilliam J. Stone of lviissouri, 
became one of the filibusterers who defeated the bill. He was generally 
pacifistic and anti-British in his beliefs and seemed to consider the 
bill unconstitutional. Sen~tor Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma was, on the 
other hand, one of the strong supporters of the bill. In the House, 
hepresentative J. Charles Linthicum of Maryland, spoke strongly for the 
bill while Dorsey W. Shackleford, and Perl D. Decker of Missouri, were 
opposed.l 
The Lake states of Ohio, Indiana, Jvlichigan, and Illinois were luke 
warm in their support of the armed rnercnant ship proposal. 'ihese states 
have a combination industrial and agricultural econo~v and hence are 
usually mixed in their political opinions. ti"1e industrial elements were 
generally in favor of the proposal while the agricultural sections tended 
to be somewhat isolationistic and to belong to the "avoid war at any cost 
group." They showed a smattering of Congressmen favoring both sides 
although they probably could be described as somewhat in tne middle be-
tween the Atlantic seaboard interventionists and the America first con-
cept of the Great Plains section which opposed the legislation. In general 
strongly favoring the bill were such as Hepresentative Henry I. Emerson 
libid. 
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of Ohio, anci James R. N1ann of Illinois, while opposing was Edward J. King 
also of Illinois.l 
'l'he Great Plains region showed tne main opposition groupings. 'This 
is somewhat traditional for this section as it is primarily agricultural 
and far removed from the seacoast and outside influences. The opDosi tion 
to the proposal and the leaders of the filibuster were centered around the 
states of Wisconsin, Nebraska, iviinnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. 
These states, along with Missouri, furnished tne only direct opposition 
in the House and almost all of the filibustering group along with its 
avowed leader, Senator iiobert LaFollette of Wisconsin. The main reasons 
for the opposition to tne President's proposal, given by chis group, were: 
Congress was giving up its responsibilities, it might lead to war, it 
was not fair to Germany, i'lall Street was to blame for the involvement, 
the timing of the bill, and a general anti-British and pro-German feeling. 
i1iuch of the rather sparse population was, anci is, of German and Scandi-
navian descent. This accounts, to a large degree, for the pro-German 
attitude. This was shown more in the Senate due to tne larger proportionate 
representation of the Plains states in tnat body. The sparse population 
resulting in few Representatives made the area less influential in the 
House than in the Senate. In addition to the leader, Senator Lafollette 
of Wisconsin, the area had Senator George Norris of Nebraska, Senator Albert 
B. Cummins of Iowa, and Representatives iiilliam H. Stafford of Wisconsin, 
Charles Lindberg of Minnesota, and Henry A. Cooper of Wisconsin, as leaders 
opposing tne bill.2 Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, was the only 
strong proponent of the legislation fro;rr the great plains. 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4639, 4640, 4646. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4895, 4908, 4652. 
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The li.ocky I;Iountain states played little -,>lrt in the sectionalism 
aspect of the controversy. '£1"le Congressional representatives -rrere in 
general favorable to the ar;nin~ of the shi~Js. The reasons for their 
favoring ran about the sa:-ie as ti10se of 1-he .Sastern se,:ahoard except there 
was less emphasis placed upon the com:nercial aspect and ;nore on tr"e pro-
tection of rights and honor, along ·•·ith uphoJ.din,ot intern:1tional law. 
Senators Thomas J. Nalsh of !fontana, Charles S. Thomas of Colorado, and 
Albert B. Fall of New Mexico were among the leaders of the Senate in the 
attempt to get the bill passed.l 
The Pacific Coast members of Congress suprorted the arm:'.ng of mer-
chant ships in the final accounting. This section vied wich the New 
i:ngland and North Atlantic, and Southern states in its sup-,;ort for tr,e 
legislation. However, in the vote to reco"unit in the House, prior to 
passa;:se, over fifty percent of the 19 members from tne Pacific Coast 
voted to recommit. All of these meJllbers then voted for passage of the 
bill. This section did not produce any of tne scronger leaders either 
pro or con in tne controversy. In the Seno.T .. e, two Se!lators joined the 
filibuster group but •nere not instrumental in the leadershiu of this 
small group. They v1ere Senators John D. <vorKs of California and Harry 
Lane of Oregon.2 Mr. Works (born and raised in Indiana) seemed to be 
somewhat of an isolationist while Senator Lane leaned toward pacifism. 
Respect for international law and the rights and honor of tf1e United 
States were some of the factors which seemed to influence the attitudes of 
this section. 
1
congressional Hecord, 64-2, p. ), 754. 1.,770, 4731. 
2Ibid., p. 4995, 5002. 
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As tne arming of the merchant ships 'IVas closely rel3.ted to the 
various ndvy bills which t)·,e Congress has from ti,ae to time acted upon, 
it might be interest,ing to compare the sectional attitudes of the areas 
of the United States on naval legislJ.tion -,.ith the1t on the ar.ned ship 
controversy. 1'he period of 1921-1932 will be used for trte action on 
Navy Legislation as it is close enough to present a reasonCJ.ble comparison. 
The vote to recommit the bill to Cmmnittee in V1e House will be used as 
it is considered to be a better indication of true attitudes of the 
Representatives than tne final vote. This vote of 2')?, to 125 was taken 
before it was obvious that the bill would pass the House and it is ap-
parent that over a hundred Representatives changed their votes to get 
on the winning side in the final roll ce.ll. 
p. 39. 
Sectional Attitudes on Navy Legislationl 
Percent Favorable of Holl Call Votes on Havy Legislation 
by Congressmen from Each Section, 1921-1932 
Section 
New England and Eorth Atlantic 
Pacific Coast 
The South 
Rocky Mountains 
Border States 
Lake States 
Great Plains 
House of' Representatives 
Democrats 
92.4 
86.0 
6~ .o 
75.6 
62 .l 
51.9 
29.3 
Republicans 
81! .9 
89.2 
8 2.8 
74.5 
78.2 
71.6 
45.5 
l~ 
u. L. Grassmuck, .:)ections.l Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, 
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Sectional Attitudes on ti1e Vote to hecommit in 
House of Representati vesl 
Section 
New England & 
North Atlantic 
The South 
l\ocky I'tlountains 
Border States 
Lake States 
Great Plains 
Pacific Coast 
Members in 
House 
123 
105 
14 
47 
75 52 
19 
I1lembers Voting 
to Ll.ecommit 
14 
12 
6 
14 
20 
36 
13 
If the Line of tne Appalachians was 'laken 
Members in Me"11bers Voting 
House to li.8CQ,.1i1li t 
East 173 14 
West 262 lll 
Percent 
11.2 
5.7 
42.3 
29.3 
26.6 
67.3 
68.3 
Percent 
3.1 
42.6 
It may readily be seen that all groups in the House except the 
Pacific Coast voted approximately the same on the armed merchant snip 
bill as they did on the later issue of Navy Legislaoion. Tne difference 
in attitude of the Pacific Coast Representaoives is in a large degree 
accounted for by the great.er distance from Euro}:e .':l.nd the vvar. This 
section had very little to gain by 3.rrning "LtlG merchantmen a.s they faced 
the Orient across the wide Pacific and did not have the submarine menace 
in t!1eir front yard. On the oker hand, Navy legislation would tend to 
benefit the shipping and shipbuilding interests of the area and this 
probably accounts for at least pilrt of ohe difference in attitude. 
It is readily apparent th.ctt sectionalism played a strong part in 
the armed ship controversy. It served to influence both sides in the 
1 11 !-Iow Congress Divided on the Proposal to Arm Merchant Ships," New 
hepublic, March 24, 1917, p. 218 • 
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matter. It aided passage in the House and i';as instrument,.H in setting 
up the filibuster in the Senate which prevEmteo its passage. 
PRESSURE fu~D ETHNIC GROUPS 
Of the 1nany pressure grou:~·S which influenced Congressional action 
at the ti1ne of t11e proposal for legislati-on to arm :tnerchant sf1ips, none 
has been more maligned than wnat is referred to as "Wall Street. 11 This 
group made loans to the Allied governments and set in motion an economic 
tie-up which was to draw the United States closer to tne Allied cause. 
Under the leadership of J. F. Morgan and company, rurchasin[' agent for 
Great Britain and France, prominent bankers underwrote loans which 
amounted to i>2,3000,000,000 dollars by tf1e time President '1/ilson sent 
his rec,uest to Congress on the merchant shi:cs.l 
'l'here can be little doubt that t~nis ·pressure to save tnej_r 1noney 
influenced the Conc;ressional action taken on the bil~. )Jhile direct 
reference to the loans themselves was not made within tne halls of Congress, 
practically all Senators 3-Dd Representatives fro'" tne areas witn_ big bank-
ing interests spoke up for protecting com:nerce and keeping tne trade lanes 
open to Great Britain and France. Senator Brande gee o£' Connecticut, spoke 
up strongly for protection of cor~1merce as did Seno1tor Lodge of l,,iassachu-
setts. 
The opposition to passage of the bill 1ns quite VOCiil in references 
to Viall Street and the influence the bankers were having upon the Congres-
sional action. Representative James H. Davis of Texas, in a speech in the 
House said: 
1congressional Record, 64-2, p. li564, 47)1, i,639, 46l,4. 
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Morgan, mammon, and money, the three r;reat J,fulochs 
that are now swaying the minds of our men and leading us 
to a death march in war, would make us sacrifice millions 
of lives and millions of money to satiate their inordinate 
greed.l 
Senator William L Kirby of Arkansas, was equally vehement in his denun-
ciation of the money lending groups when sp,oaking in the Senate on 
March 2, said: 
What do we find yonder in New York? l picked up a 
paper two or three days ago, and it said what? It said, 
"Wall Street is impatient of the delay; Wall Street pre-
fers war to the suspense which injures business . 11 2 
It might be noted that of all the serious opposition to the bill, 
none came from the money loaning sections of New York City, Boston, and 
Philadelphia. 
Closely aligned with the money lenders were the industrialists. 
This group, particularly the munitions makers, has received muc·~ blame 
for the involvement of the United States in tne war. This was due, in 
large degree, to the report of a Senate committee, headed by Senator 
Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota in the mid-thirties, which showed the 
munhions makers made huge profits in the years l9lLL-l9l7. It must be 
remembered, however, that the United States !oad been in a depression 
shortly before tne war and the traffic in war supplies and loans to pay 
for them had brought the country out of the doldrums. In short, tne 
trade was perhaps as essential to the economic life of America as it 
was to the military life of the Allies.3 
The support for the arming of merchant ships and hence the continu-
ing of trade and prosperity came from all the industrial sections of the 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4676. 
2Ioid., p. 4771. 
3T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the ,:cmerican People, p. 622. 
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country particularly the industrial East. The issue of co,mnerce had 
been introduced into the matter by President, Wilson when he made his 
request for legislation by directly referring to the suffering of our 
shipping and the timidity of ship owners who would not leave American 
ports without guns and gun crews.l The many Congressmen who stressed 
the commercial aspects of the decline in shipping show the great effect, 
and general pressure, this group was able to exert. 
The opponents of the bill, who generally stated that the action 
if taken would lead to war, blamed the industrialists for nruch of the 
pressure that was exerted to enforce international law and protect our 
shipping. Representative Henry T. Helgeson of North Dakota minced no 
words when he addressed the House and said: 
In the event of war the munitions makers and 
manufacturers of arms and machinery of war reap rich 
harvests of wealth. What are a few millions of human 
lives--the lives of the common people--compared with 
the enormous accretion of wealth to the chosen few? ••• 
If the people know this their voice will resound a 
mighty cry against the war that will bring death and 
destruction to the many and blood stained riches to 
the few •••• 2 
It might be noted that Mr. Helgeson and so many of his cohorts had very 
little to gain or lose as far as industry or commerce was concerned. 
The pressure of the agricultural elements was not readily apparent 
in the struggle. While practically all the opposition in the House of 
Representatives (considering the vote to recommit as the index) came 
from agricultural states, it. is considered this factor had less to do 
with the voting patterns than sectionalism, personality factors, and 
lMessages and Papers of i'loodrow Wilson, Review of Reviews, p. 363. 
2congressional Record, 6L,-2, p. 4660. 
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some of the otner characteristics affecting the action. In the Senate 
the same consideration held. While a certain small portion of the 
pressure producing the filibuster may have been from agricultural areas, 
once again this was not one of the primary factors. The South, being 
primarily agricultural, was strong for the bill and supported it more 
firmly than any grouping except the industrial East. 'l'his runs counter 
to the Great Plains section which, being almost entirely agricultural, 
furnished the direct and coordinated opposition. The high prosperity 
of the farmers throughout the country probably counted for the mild 
pressure this group tended to exert upon its representatives in Washing-
ton. The high farm prices caused by the snipping of great amounts of 
food to Europe did much to quiet the normal pressures. llnile tile agri-
cultural elements in the United States are traditionally anti-interven-
tionist and isolationistic, their effect was relatively minor in the 
halls of Congress on this occasion. 
The hyphenated-JlJllericans formed one of tne pressure groups which 
exerted what pressure it couid to block the armed ship bill. i'hese 
foreign born citizens, because of tneir prior exposure to foreign 
ideologies and customs, are limited in their political interest to a 
narrow band of issues affecting their fnother-land and tne welfare of 
their own nationality group. Lord Bryce in his Araerican Co:nmorr::eal th 
aptly described tne A.merican foreign Oorn vote: 
The Lnmigrants vote, chat is tney obtain votes after 
three or four years' residence at ;nost (often less), but 
they are not fit for t.ne sufferage. '.i'hey knorj nothing of 
tile institutions of "Lne country, of its statesmen, of its 
political issues. !'lei tiler from Central i!:urope nor from 
Ireland do t11ey bring much knowledge of the l:lethods of 
free government, and from Ireland they bring a suspicion 
of all government. Incompetent to give an intelligent 
vote, but soon finding that their vote has a value; they 
fall into the hands of tile party organizations, whose 
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officers enroll tnBJn to their lists and undertake to fetch 
them to the polls ••• Sucn a sacrifice of common sense 
to abstract principles has seldom been made by any country.l 
1'he two groupings wnich were the strongest and most vocal were 
the Irish-Americans and the German-Americans. 'rne Irish-americans 
in spite of much concentration in the states of Massachusetts, hhode 
Island, Connecticut, and ~ew York were able to exert lictle pressure 
upon the members of Congress on this issue. The Congressmen from 
these states led the fight for the bill and were almost unanimous in tneir 
supoort. Contrariwise the German-American group exerted considerable 
effect upon the bill in both Senate and House. 'rhe strong German ele-
ments in Wisconsin, Minnesota, North and South Dakota, and Missouri 
furnished tne backbone of the opposition in both nouses. There were many 
pro-German utterances in the Congress during the debate on the bill. 
Senators Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, Illioses E. Clapp of lliinnesota, 
and Albert B. Cwrunins of Iowa along witn Representatives Henry A. Cooper 
of viisconsin, and Perl D. Decker of 1/Jissouri, were among those ma.lcing 
pro-German speeches in their respective houses .2 The three states of 
North Dakota, Minnesota, and Nisconsin had very high foreign born per-
centage of the population compared to the remainder of the united States. 
A perhaps non-related item of interest is that three of tne most impor-
tant attempts to establish tnird political parties came out of these 
three states and found tneir greatest support there. These were the 
Non-Partisan League, the Farm-Labor Party, and the Progressive Party.3 
The effect of the Eastern seaboard on the Congressional action 
lJ. Turner, Party and Constituency, Pressures in Congress, p. 98. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4999, 4908, 4637, 4649. 
3J. Turner, Party and Constituency, Pressures in Congress, p. 100. 
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has been touched upon in several ways in the previous discussion, This 
grouping which combined the pressures exerted by the industrialists, 
the money-lenders, the Southern championship of honor and rights of 
Americans, the sagacity of the Eastern political bosses and interests, 
the nearness. to the war, the Anglo-Saxon heritage and other elements was 
the largest single pressure influence upon the Congress. 'l'hese interests 
controlled a majority of the important newspapers of the heavily populated 
East as well as the syndicated news agencies which sent their stories 
to the rest of the country. This area, more than others, was subjected 
to British propaganda and received the war news direct from the British 
controlled Atlantic cable. The solid unity of the Atlantic States gave 
them a strong lever to use in influencing the other members of the Con-
gress to their way of thinking. 
The pressure and ethnic groups played a moderately important part 
in the armed ship controversy, Although a great nany of the effects 
came over a period of several years, they were present at the accounting 
when the bill was passed in the House and defeated by filibuster in the 
Senate. None of these pressure and ethnic effects can be discounted in 
analyzing the struggle. 
ISOLATIONISM 
At the time of the armed ship controversy the term "isolationist" 
had not become a household term as it was later to become in the "thirties" 
and during World War II. Nevertheless, there have always been a great 
number of isolationists in tne United States and tnere probably always 
will be, although in recent years the philosophy has become increasingly 
unpopular, During the armed ship controversy there was considerable 
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isolationistic feeling present in Congress. iliiany Senators and Repre-
sentatives seemed to feel that the United States should stay out of 
Europe and withdraw to our own shores and keep what we had to ourselves. 
We could "live alone and like it" was expressed many times in both the 
House and Senate by the groupings that opposed the legislation. It 
might be interesting to note that one of the isolationists was Repre-
sentative Charles Lindbergh of Minnesota, the father of the frunous 
aviator who was later to play a leading role in the attempt to keep 
the United States out of European affairs in the mid-thirties prior to 
World War II. 
The preservation of ~~rican lives and resources was one of the 
topics dwelt upon by those with isolationistic sentiments. Senator 
Harry Lane of Oregon, who took a relatively passive part as one of the 
filibustering group, seemed more influenced by ti1e food prices and the 
prospective loss of American men and resources, if the bill should be 
followed by war, expressed himself in the Senate as follows: 
I think it would be a matter of plain common sense and 
we would preserve our neutrality with all nations better by 
letting them fight it out in their nice little selected zones 
or prize ring, or whatever they wish to call it, 811d we could 
be the referee or help sponge them off when they get their 
noses bloodied. • • • The mass of people would do the fight-
ing 811d upon their backs rests the nations existence •••• 
Our food should be used for our own people and they should 
manufacture supplies at a reasonable cost, at a fair price, 
and put tnis country in a position so that no nation would 
think of coming over here or would think a long time before 
they would try it.l 
Senator Lane, like almost all the Congressmen in Opf>'OSition to the bill, 
constantly referred to the fact that tnis bill might, or would, get us 
into the war 811d attacked it on that issue. He was one of the few 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 5004, 
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Congressmen on either side who complained bitterly about the shortages 
and high prices of food. T'his might have been felt more in his state of' 
Oregon, although the farming element of that state must have benefited 
along with the other agricultural, or partially agricultural, states. 
In the House of Representatives, Mr. Charles H. Dillon of 3outh 
Dakota attacked President Wilson's idea of a League of Nations to follow 
the War on the floor of the House. He said: 
Let us content ourselves with the maintenance of the 
Monroe Doctrine. To extend the Monroe Doctrine over the 
nations of Europe is a visionary dream. Let us abandon 
the thought of this fatal blunder.l 
Mr. Dillon continued his speech against the arming of the shiPs by recom-
mending the United States join the other neutrals, in league of armed 
neutrals, and believed a victorious Germany would not be a danger to the· 
United States. 
Representative Philip P. Campbell of Kansas, one of the leaders in 
the fight against the proposed legislation in the House, was a confirmed 
believer in "America first." In a speech oefore the House he strongly 
advocated keeping f'ooci and munitions at home, Among other ohings he 
said: 
We need the food and munitions at home. Is it useless 
to urge the necessity of conserving for our own country our 
food and our munitions of war? •• , AS between the neces-
sities of' our ovm people and country and other people and 
countries is but one choice our own country,2 
Representative Campbell did not seem to care that we were not sending food 
and munitions to Germany as well as to the Allies and neutrals but believed 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4650. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 463B. 
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in keeping all of our food at home for American use. 
The opponents of the bill, who were true isolationists, did not 
care whether the Allies or Germany won the war and would have been glad 
to see the conflagration end up with neither side victorious. It was a 
"stay out of our affairs and we will stay out of yours" concept which 
they wanted applied to all of Europe. It was somewhat of an unrealistic 
concept and not particularly apnlicable to the world in 1917. This group 
did not feel that a victorious Germany would be a th::eat of danger to the 
United States. They were largely uneffected by the international law, 
rights and honor of the United States, and preservation of democracy issues 
which came up so often in the speeches in the halls of Congress during 
the last week in February and first weeks of lVJarch in 1917. 
There were a few in Congress who opposed the bill whose prime moti-
vation seemed to be pacificism. They were onposed to war in any form and 
would have cheerfully given up cherished rignts in order to avoid any 
possioility of being involved in the conflagration. In the Senate, James 
K. Varda11Jai1 of 11\ississippi, "as the prime example of this attitude, al-
though Senator William J. Stone of iris so uri had leanings that way. Senator 
Vardaman was an ardent admirer of William Jennings nryan and apceared to 
be quite willing to give up all right to escape involvement. In the Senate 
he said: 
I submit it would be more profitable to tne people of 
the United States--better for the peoDles of tne world, 
rather tna.n involve the United States in that war, to sus-
pend commerce between Europe and America so far as American 
shipping interests are concerned. • • • I mignt have a 
right to go in tne streets where a duel was being fougf1t 
by participants in a drunken mob, but it would i:Je better 
for me if I exercised tne prudence of a brave, sane man, 
and remained away from the da.ng,er zone until order should 
be restored .1 ' 
lcongressional Ii.ecord, 6h-2, p. 4779. 
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liir. Vardaman stood by his principles and joined t,ne LaFollette group in 
conducting the filibuster. 
Tnere was also some genuine pacifists in the House although, like 
the Senate, they were rather few and far between. Representative Dorsey 
W. Shackleford of 11iissouri was one of those whose major premise seemed 
to be opposition to any possibility of becoming involved in the war. 
He was joined in this by the Socialist Representative from New York, Meyer 
London. These men were consistent in their beliefs and up to this time 
had also voted against the appropriation bills for tne Army and Navy. 
The importance of the isolationist grouping is quite hard to assess. 
It can account for the actions of some of the opponents of the bill such 
as Senators Lane and Varda~an to a considerable degree. fu~ong the many 
causes for tne fight in Congress, it is believed this issue was one of 
the minor ones. Wbile intimately connected with the more important factors 
whicn prevented the passage of the bill suct1 as sectionalism and pressure 
and ethnic groupings, it did not, by any means, have the effect these 
other factors produced. 
There was not much sentiment for direct interventionism in the 
European War either in Congress or with the people of tne United States 
at the time of the President's armed ship request. The feeling was more 
of let's help the Allies and do everything we can to insure that they win 
the war. Although tnere were many influential persons in tne country such 
as Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood who advocated open inter-
vention, the personalities in Congress who kept urging a strong stand 
against Germany such as, Senator Henry Caoot Lodge of Massachusetts, and 
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Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, were discreet in tneir utterances 
concerning milita~J intervention. 
There was a fairly strong sentiment in the country, particularly 
along the Atlantic seaboard, that Germany should not be allowed to win 
the war. There was a fear of German militarism. This nas existed for 
sometime due to the saber rattlings of tne Kaiser and some of his actions 
concerning Venezuela and other Latin American countries. This feeling 
was considerably increased when the Zimmerman note was made public. 
Many Americans began to think about what the situation might be if the 
British Navy were turned over to the Germans and how -che Monroe Doctrine 
could be maintained if Germany were victorious. There were many speeches 
in Congress which touched upon this issue during the armed ship debates. 
While not a direct issue, the issue of German militarism could be found 
underlying many of the supporting speeches. 
Along with the fear of German militarism, as an underlying element 
in the support of the bill, was the thought that the Allies were fighting 
for democracy as against autocracy. This issue has been carefully fos-
tered by the British in tneir propaganda crunpaign and this, with the help 
of certain literary persons in tne United States, did 11IUCh to persuade their 
countrymen that Great Britain was fighting their fight.l Secretary of 
State, Robert Lansing, was one of the persons in high office who believed 
Germany was a 1oonace to American liberties everywhere. He expressed concern 
that the American people did not perceive that German absolutism was a 
menace to their liberties and to democratic institutions everywnere.2 
lT. A. Bailey, ! Diplomatic History of tne American People, p. 614. 
2R. Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, p. 112. 
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These feelings were present in the House and Senate in the spring of 1917, 
although often presented under some other guise. 
Senator Albert !Ji. Fall of New mexico was one of the few Congressmen 
who openly advocated going to war with Germany during the armed ship con-
troversy. Speaking before the Senate on ioJarch 3, 1917, he said: 
Mr. President, I am always frank. lf the Senate of 
the United States followed my advice it would within 15 
minutes declare a general public war against the Imperial 
German Government and authorize the President of the United 
States, as I suggested in the bill which I introduced a 
few days ago, to raise additional land forces for the de-
fense of this country.l 
However, while a great many Congressmen obviously felt the same way, they 
refused to say so in such blunt terms. 
There was much discussion of the eJ.ement of national nonor during 
the debates. There were many who held that tne United States :.llllst con-
tinue her support of shipping and not be intimidated by tne German threat. 
This was a particularly paramount issue in tlle South wlrich seemed some-
what more militant than the other sections of the country. Some of the 
expressions on this matoer may be seen in tne Congressional Record for 
the 64th Congress: 
The present bill is a bill of self-respect. A bill 
for the decent regard of our own rights and duties in the 
world, nothing more. In my judgement this bill cor~s a 
month too late. It has been an intolerable soectacle to 
see our vessels, our citizens, and our mails confined in 
the ports of the United States without that measure of 
government protection to which they are unquestionably 
entitled.2 
I congratulate the !"resident of tne United States 
for waking up on tnis question, and regret tnat he has 
been inactive for the last three years. • • • Vie will 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 1.!8 70. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 46h4, liepresentative J. J. Rogers, 
Massachusetts. 
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be respected throughout the world when we give the world 
to understand that no American citizen, acting v;ithin 
his rights, can be harmed or injured on any sea or in 
any foreign land.l 
The protection of American honor, alone; with that of American 
rights, could be found in most of the speeches in favor of the proposal. 
These were fine, upstanding issues and could be upheld without question-
ing of motives. Another issue, rather loosely grouped under interven-
tionism, was the issue of protection of international law. iJhile not 
openly advocating going to war over the point, the different interpreta-
tions of international law by Germany and the United States could not 
help but lead to some sort of a clash unless one or the other gave in. 
Senators Henry Cabot Lodge of l!JB.ssachusetts, and Robert L. Owen 
of Oklahoma, spoke quite extensively on the cnatter and the need for the 
United States to uphold that law. Senator Owen declared that it was the 
right and duty of the President to observe international law and that he 
was compelled by the laws of neutrality to maintain it.2 The Congressmen 
in the House of Representatives were equally vociferous in demanding 
that the rules of international law be upheld and maintained. Represen-
tative Simeon D. Fess of Ohio was one of' the many who spoke strongly on 
the issue .3 
The importance of the interventionist sentiment on the action of 
Congress in the armed ship controversy is like most of the other elements, 
difficult to assess. The rather intangible factors that make up this 
grouping cannot be accurately measured. That the elements of fear of 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4668, Representative R. VI. Austin, 
Tennessee. 
2Ibid, p. 5010. 
3rbid, p. 4668. 
54 
German militarism, national honor, upholding of international law, and 
the support for democracy were important issues whicn influenced the 
action of Congress certainly cannot be denied. However, t!1eir effect 
on tne rank and file of Congress was considerably less than that of the 
pressure and ethnic groups and sectionalism. 
PERSONALITY FACTOR 
There are usually present in government circles of the United States 
some figures whose political actions do not fall into the standard mold. 
J:'hey are generally strong figures who have the strength of their convic-
tions in matters which make them stand out from their compatriots in the 
government. They are often reactionaries (or are branded reactionaries) 
and also are often the leaders of the party in power. They stand out above 
tne rest and are either hated or loved and never seem to oe in tne middle. 
It would be nonsense 1.0 say that these ;nen are note affected by -che familiar 
elements of poli"tical action in tne United States such as sectionalism, 
pressure groups, ethnic groups, isolationistic or internationalist trends, 
etc., but somehow on many occasions they manage to rise above the conven-
tional and to stand on their own two feet on the strengtn of their own 
convictions or animosities. Throughout the history of the united States 
such men as these have come to be honored or d~nned for their actions and 
deeds on government issues. In the analysis of the armed ship controversy, 
four personalities in the Congress, who took a prominent part, are con-
sidered to fall into this category. It is apDreciated that there is 
considerable difference of opinion on this subject (and there probably 
always will be), but somehow these men in actions both at this time and 
at other times in their careers seemed to rise above the normal in their 
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influence and effect. The four personalities tnat are chosen because they 
stand out above the rest in their effect upon the Senate of ti1e 6hth Con-
gress are Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, George ',i. Norris of Nebraska, 
John Sharpe Williams of Mississippi, and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachu-
setts. While tnere were many strong personalities in the House of Repre-
sentatives, it is not considered that any of them reach the stature of 
those listed above. 
Robert I~rion LaFollette was the avowed leader of the filibuster in 
the Senate. As a result of his action he brought a scorm of criticism 
about his head that has almost been unequalled in the history of the United 
States Congress. Tne question of why he did it is interesting and involved. 
LaFollette had a long and distinguished career in politics at the time of 
the filibuster. He was 62 years old at the time, in excellent health and 
had served in the Senate since 1905. Previous to his election to the 
Senate he had served three terms as the Governor of Wisconsin and prior 
to that had served for three terms in the House of Representatives of 
the United States .1 At the time of the filibuster he had reached the 
height of his career and was known to have Presidential ambitions. 
In his Autobiography, LaFollette said that his supren~ issue was 
to prevent the "encroachment of the powerful few upon tile rights of the 
many." It was apparently his sincere belief that tile United States was 
rushing headlong into war for the shipping interests, the munitions 
interests, and other connnercial profiteers along with the belief that 
Congress was abrogating its right to declare war if it passed the armed 
ship bill. He considered that war was being forced upon an unwilling people. 
lcongressional Directory, 6hth Congress, p. 120. 
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This stand made him the subject of public abuse, denouncer,Jent, and invec-
tive. His colleagues turned their backs upon him in the cloaKrooms of 
the Senate; he was read out of his clubs; denounced bv both Houses of the 
Congress; and it was to bring him, at last, to sit white-faced and silent 
as he listened to the Senatorial proceedings which charged him with dis-
loyalty to tile government and treasonable and seditionous utterances. 
'Ihe Senator from vVisconsin voted his convictions and was not 
greatly influenced by nis party or other outside influences. He 1>wored 
lower tariffs and voteci for the Underwood Tariff Bill against his partv 
and his constituents. When he led the heterogeneov_s ;~roup whic:O con-
ducted the filibuster, Senator LaFolletce Yias acting primarily on his own 
convictions. In opposition to tne bill he strongly expressed l1imself: 
Shall we break the peace of tne neutral half of tne 
world and for what? for co~nercial advantage and fat 
profits beneficial to a limited number of our dollar-
scarred patriots; for neutral right wnicn we surrendered 
to the belligerents on one side during the first three 
months of the war. • • • The multitudes who are dying 
in the trenches, and tne millions who are suffering mOre 
agonizing pains at home, do not know what it is all 
about. • • • The bill is not only unconstitutional; it 
is foolish and inadequate. • • There is no evidence 
to warrant tne conclusion that arming the snips will 
afford protection .1 
LaFollette maintained his principles to the bitter end and never compro-
mised on his stand. However, it might be said that after war was declared, 
he supported the war measures which he tnen considered necessary after 
the irrevocable decision. 
On certain occasions one finds liberal leaders st&<ding shoulder 
to shoulder with deep-dyed reactionaries. This was tne case with George 
W. Norris when he joined forces with the filioustering group to defeat 
lLaFollette' s Magazine, March 1917. 
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the armed merchant ship bill in the Senate. Senator Norris was in his 
middle fifties and at the height of his career when he took this danger-
ous political step. He had served ten years in tne House of Representa-
tives of the United States and been elected to tne Senate in 1912.1 
Although generally considered to be liberal in his attitudes concerning 
internal problems of the United States, he was unalterably opposed to 
war and to United States participation in European and World affairs. 
Senator Norris objected to the bill on the grounds that Congress 
was delegating its authority to the President, that a special session 
of Congress should have been called for the bill, and that this action 
would make the President's power limitless. In speaking before the 
Senate he attacked the proposal eloquently and fiercely: 
If' the President wants to keep in close touch with 
the Houses of Congress, then Congress must be in session, 
according to his own words delivered to us officially. 
Can we say that the President meant, "I want to be in 
close touch with you, and therefore I want you to separate 
and go to the four points of the earth?" • • • • >Ve have tne 
sole authority under the Constitution to declare war, and 
while this bill does not in express terms say that we ab-
dicate that power and turn it over to the President, it 
gives the President authority which, if he exercises it, 
takes that power away from Congress just as completely 
as if we had amended the Constitution and taken those words 
out of it. It will not answer to say the President will 
not exercise that authority. For God's sake, why give it 
to him if you do not expect him to exercise it? Others 
say the President has it now. Well, then, what is the use 
of giving it to him again in a statute. Will that make it 
any better?2 
Later on in his Autobiography, Mr. Norris once again expressed his reason 
for joining the filibuster against the armed ship proposal while at the 
same time expressing his general aversion to the tactic in general: 
lcongressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. 61. 
2congressional Record, 64-2, p. 5007. 
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I felt the passage of the proposed bill • • • would 
automatically plunge the United States into the War ••• 
Feeling so strongly, I felt the filibuster was justified 
in spite of my repugnance to the method.l 
In the uproar following the defeat of the proposal, the filibuster-
ing group was castigated by the President, by all sections of the press, 
by political leaders, by various clubs and groups, and in general by most 
of the United States. Senator Norris took a step which indicated his 
strong character and personal integrity when he publically offered to 
submit his action in opposing the arming of American merchant ships to 
the judgement of the voters of Nebraska on a special election. He would 
resign if the vote went against him.2 This was indicative of a man of 
the stature of Norris and his continuance in the Senate to represent the 
voters of Nebraska for many more years indicated their faith and belief 
in him. 
John Sharpe Williams, Senator from Mississippi, was another who rose 
above the standard political pressure groups and parties to support mea-
sures and issues that his party had not espoused. The fact that he was 
from a one party state may have had something to do witn this as political 
reprisals at the polls were hard to arrange, but in general he voted as 
his conscience dictated. At this time he was 63 years of age and a long-
time veteran of Congressional foibles. He had served through eight terms 
in the House of Representatives and was starting his second term in the 
Senate.3 Needless to say, he was a Democrat and thus a member of the 
President's party. 
lB. M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle, p. 375. 
2New nepublic, March 24, 1917, p. 211. 
3congressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. 53. 
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Senator Williams made known his views on partisan issues on many 
occasions. When he spoke in Congress on ]'jarch 14, 1922, he said: 
Mr. President, I am a Democrat, a Bourbon Democrat, 
a plain blamed-fool Mississippi Democrat. I have no 
patience with Republicans and I have no patience with 
partisanship in connection with international affairs.l 
Concerning minority pressure groups he also said, at the same time, of 
the Four Power Treaty discussions: 
It is a great pity that Great Britain is a party 
to it, because if she were not, all the German-American 
and Irish-American ooposition to it would have ceased 
long ago.2 • 
Later in the 80th Congress he again expressed himself: 
I did not come here as a Democrat necessarily, because 
we have only an·insignificant number of Republicans in my 
district, so I do not have to vote along partisan lines. 
I vote as my conscience tells me and I do not intend to go 
into this thing blindfolded.) 
Senator Williams strongly supported the armed ship bill in the 
Senate. He believed in it and felt that it should be enacted into law. 
When it appeared likely that the small group of twelve would possibly 
succeed in preventing a vote, he expressed himself vitriolicly as 
follows: 
Mr. President, one of t,he most humiliating spectacles 
in the course of American history will be presented if tnere 
be an adjournment of this Congress and this bill, whether 
amended or unamended, with this object and with this purpose 
in view, shall have been defeated by the United States 
Senate. It will be +,he most humiliating page in the history 
of the Senate itself. • • • The President has awai<:ened to the 
fact that American honor and American self-respect are at 
stake; the House has awakened; the countrJ has a11akened; and 
here stands a corporal's guard of men who deny to me, the 
Senator of a sovereign state--to you, the Senator from apother, 
the right to express our opinion by a vote in this body.4 
lG. 1. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress, p. 62. 
2Ibid. 
3J. Turner, Party and Constituency, Pressures on Congress, p. 178. 
4congressional Record, 64-2, p. 4991. 
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Mr. Williams fought hard for tne passage of the bill but his efforts were 
to no avail as the members of the filibustering group were adamant. 
another personage who seemed to stand out above the rank and file 
was Henry Cahot Lodge, tne author and "scholar" of the Senate. While 
Lodge was later to hate Woodrow Wilson with a consuming bitterness and 
to attack and defeat the proposals for the United States to join the 
League of Nations and to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, he, at this 
time, supported the President. Senator Lodge was a strong personality 
and the acknowledged authority on international law in the Senate in 
tne spring of 1917. 
Mr. Lodge was tne senior Republican in the Senate and hence minor-
ity leader. He had served eight years in the House and was then serving 
his fifth term in the Senate.l Had Senator Lodge not supported the 
President' s proposal, there m:Lght have been considerabJ.e partisan pressure 
built up against it. However, the Republicans had been for i'ir:ner action 
against Germany in earlier years and it would have been ratner difficult 
for them to reverse their stand. Mr. Lodge, while not extre;nely voracious 
in supporting the bill, did express himself in its favor as follows: 
I am going to vote to give the President the power 
which I think he ougnt to have in answering his request; 
then the responsibility is his. I would not have Congress 
refuse what he asks when this country is at odds with a 
foreign nation. ~/hen I give I am going to give freely; 
I am not willing to tie strings to tne gift; I arn not 
going to send it to the President witl1 statements which 
I think would show an utter lack of' faith in his purposes 
and intentions. If I am going to give at all I arn going 
to give freely; I am going to give the President what he 
wants.2 
lcongressional Directory, 64th Congress, p. ~~. 
2con,:;ressional ltecord, 6L-2, p. 4751. 
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It is iEteresting to surmise what ·would 1·1ave been t-ile out.. cmne o1' the 
armed shiT; bill in the Senate if lvir. Lodge nad ac"Llvely op:!JOsed it. 
One of the most important, if not the most important considerations 
in a Congressional squabble is the caliber of the leadership. This was 
particularly true in the fight to arm the merchant ships. 'l'he leadership 
in the House was strong, coordinated and dedicated to the purpose of 
getting the bill passed in accordance witn ti1e wisioes of President Wilson. 
Leadership, as is often the case with individual bills, did not follow 
party lines and was not exercised through the established cnannels, i.e., 
the majority and minority leaders and the various whips, etc. ',he leader-
ship in tne House was strictly non-partisan and a cowbination of efforts, 
led by tne Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, henry D. Flood 
of Virginia. 
It was largely due to the organizational efforts of llir. Hood that 
the bill went tnrough tne House without a great deal of difficulty. The 
request of Mr. Wilson was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and iVJr. Flood promptly came up with a bill embodying the necessary 
authority and presented it to t.'1e House for action and amendment. His 
astute leadership was everywhere present and it can be said with surety 
that he was the Jiepresentative most responsible for its success. There 
is little doubt that !ilr. Flood believed sincerely in what he was doing. 
In speaking before the House, he insisted that the United States must 
protect its shiFS and its citizens; that it must protect A~lerican lives, 
uphold American honor, and make Germany pay for any losses .1 In a state-
lcongressional hecord, 64-2, p. 5637. 
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ment to the press which appeared in the Hew York J.'imes, Current History 
i,·E_gazine he reiterated his stand as follows: 
Germany, he said, imd violated tice promises made in 
the interchange of notes betvreen ti,e United States and 
trtat nation, and she is now undertaKing to destroy every 
merchant vessel, whether belligerent or neutral, that is 
undertaking to land at any port of Great Britain or Ire-
land, on the Atlantic coast, or eastern ports of the 
l.ledi terrane an. The American Berchant Marine is tied un 
in our harbors and A.:nerican Commerce is olockaded in our 
ports as effectually as if an enemy had blockaded those 
ports. This condition is intolerable to a free and a 
brave people, and i-c has continued as long as the ameri-
can Government and the American people are willing to 
submit to it. 'l'he pending bill gives the President the 
means to remedy this intolerable condition and free our 
commerce and protect the lives of American citizens in 
their lawful pursuits on the high seas.l 
The majority leader in the House, Claude Kitchen of North Carolina, sup-
ported the bill but onlo' in a limited sense. His expressions of support 
were only lukewarm and one gets the impression that if the bill had been 
proposed by a Republican President, 1lr. Kitchen would have been in op-
position or at least neutral. In contrast to Mr. Kitchen, one can find 
the minority leader of the House, Mr. James R. ]l'iann of Illinois, in strong 
support of the proposal. If this had not been so, then it is considered 
the bill might have had a much tougher and more controversial treatment 
on the floor of the House of Representatives. In expressing strong sup-
port lllr. Mann said: 
I long ago would have given the President of the United 
States the power to protect against unlawful attacks the 
citizens of the United States engaged in lawful and peaceful 
persuits in the Republic of Iooxico and I believe we ought to 
give him the power now to save our rights, our dignity, our 
people, our patriotism, and our Nation; and I hope and I be-
lieve that in giving this power to the President we are more 
apt to keep out of war than we are to have a declaration of 
lNew York Times, Current History :Magazine, p. 50. 
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war. I hope we will not have to declare war. I do not 
want to become involved in the European wari but I am 
willing to protect the rights of Americans. 
The actions of Mr. Mann in the House did a great deal, as did those of 
Senator Lodge in the Senate, to keep the party issue ab1ost entirely out 
of the controversy, Had he opposed the bill instead of being one of the 
strong supporters, it is probable that a considerable number of the 199 
Republicans in the House would have been influenced. 
Representative John Jacob Rogers of lv1assachusetts was one of the 
most vocal and rather rabid leaders in getting the bill approved in the 
House. He verged on being an interventionist and claimed that the bill 
was not strong enough, that the President should have taken stronger 
action than to request authority to arm merchant ships,2 h:r, Rogers, a 
lawyer from Harvard, insisted the bill was already too late and that the 
United States could do nothing less and keep its self-respect. 
J. Charles Linthicom of Maryland spoke long and loudly in favor of 
the proposal. He demanded that action be taken to protect the commerce 
of the United States and to give the President the backin?; he had asked 
for and deserved.3 Mr. Linthicum recited the "Star Spangled Banner" in 
one of his emotional speeches, but whether this accomplished anything is 
unknown. The commercial interests of Baltimore (liJr. Linthicum's home 
district) may have had much to do with his strong defense of the protection 
of shipping and commerce, 
There were many other leaders in the House of Representatives who 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4640. 
2Ibid., p. 4644. 
3Ibid,, p. 4645. 
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aided and supported the proposal to arm American merchant shipping. 
Generally the reasons given were similar or identical to those already 
advanced. It would be somewhat repetitious to present these reasons 
individually as they fall within the listings already presented in 
Chapter II. Among the leaders were: 
William s. Bennett, Republican, New York 
Robert L. Henry, Democrat, Texas 
Henry I. Emerson, Republican, Ohio 
Henry W. Temple, Republican, Pennsylvania 
J. 1'homas Heflin, Democrat, Alabama 
Thomas W. Miller, Democrat, Delaware 
Rici1ard W, Austin, Republican, Tennessee 
It might be noted that of che leaders supporting tne bill only one 
came from west of the ivri.ssissippi. He was from Texas. The Atlantic 
seaboard provided the majority of the leaders, the industrial East having 
the most and the South the next greatest number. The Lake States provided 
two while none came from the Great Plains, Rocky Mountains, or Pacific 
Coast. 
CONGRESSIONAL LEADJ>..C(S ~'AVOKING 'Ilili BILL--SENA'l'E 
It was unfortunate for tne President of the United States that the 
leadership in the Senate was not up to the caliber of that in the House. 
While that in the House was determined, strong, aggressive, intelligent, 
and above all, united, the same cannot be said for the Senate. Where the 
House was united, the Senate was split, There was no one to shepherd the 
bill through the Senate with the same finess showed by Mr. Flood of 
Virginia, and the same unity of approach shown by both Republican and 
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Democratic leaders in the House. A considerable portion oi' tne difference 
may be attributed to the different rules of' the two Houses of Congress 
but a greater difference was the resoluteness of the leadership. It is 
now apparent that if the leadership under Mr. Hitchcock had held firm on 
the night of March 2, the filibuster would have failed due to the length 
of time remaining in the Session. '1\fnen the Senate recessed until the 
next morning, the filibustering group knew they had succeeded. It mignt 
be said for the Senate leadership that the defection of Mr. Stone to tne 
other side nurt their cause considerably as to strategy and unity of 
purpose. 
The senior Senator from Nebraska, Gilbert 111. Hitcncock, became the 
primary leader of the Administration forces on the afternoon of ~iarch 2, 
when Senator Stone joined the forces of LaFollette. ivir. tii tchcock was the 
second senior Democrat on the Senate Co~Tiittee on Foreign tielations and 
succeeded to the leadership on the bill when JJ!I'. Stone, the Chairman of 
that Co1nmittee, decided to oppose it. Senator Hitcncock was not particu-
larly strong for the proposal. He seemed to reflect more tne attitude of 
the Midwest and while probably doing his best as party leader to carry 
out tne wishes of the Chief Executive did not display any strength of 
purpose or dynamic leadership. He expressed confidence in the President 
and suggested tnat the arming of the ships was the safest course and least 
likely to lead to war.l It might be said that Mr. Hitchcock was a tried 
and true party man and followed the orders of his party leadership. 
Among the leaders in support of the bill in the Senate was Thomas 
'II. Hardwick of Georgia. Senator Hardwick spoke many times in support of 
lcongressional tiecord, 64-2, p. 5017. 
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-che measure and left no doubt as to how he stood, Jiis reasons for support 
were that he considered it necessary to preserve peace, to protect the 
rights of American citizens, and tne surest way to peace was to prepare 
to maintain rights ,l Mr. Hardwick also considered tnat Ji;r. Wilson already 
had the right to arm the ships. In speaking tc the Senate of lVJarch 3, he 
maintained: 
The President of the United States, by virtue of his 
inherent powers, conferred on him by the Constitution as 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States 
and as the Chief Executive of this great Nation, in which 
all executive power is lodged, has the natural, the inherent 
right to protect citizens of the United States against wrong 
and injury and unlawful attack whenever and wherever such wrong, 
injury, or unlawful attack may threaten,2 
He was joined in this belief by several other Senators as ,;ell as by the 
President himself, In the Senate, Senators Walsh of i~ontana, ar1d Suther-
land of Utah, supported this view of the Presidential powers. 
About the most voluble of the Senate leaders was Frank Jrandegee 
of Connecticut. As has previously been mentioned, this gentleman was 
much concerned over the tie-up of shipping on the coastal ports of the 
United States and he was strongly in favor of getting the ships moving. 
He firmly believed in protecting United States shipping and said in the 
Senate on March 3, that the only distinction between what exists and real 
war is that Germany is waging war and we decline to defend ourselves,3 
Two of tne Senate leaders have been discussed under the "personality" 
heading and it is not believed necessary or desirable to repeat their 
stands and why they took the S&'lle, These are Senators Lodge of lliassachuset ts 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4906, 
2Ibid, 
3Ibid,' p. 4868. 
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and Williams of iviississippi. Botn supported the bill for tr1e reasons 
already given, 
In addition to those already mentioned, several Senators from wide 
spread areas ranged themselves alongside the bastern leaders and took an 
active part in attempting to get the bill tnrough the Senate. Two of 
these who seemed to exert the most influence were Thomas J, Walsh of 
Montana and Albert B. Fall of New Mexico. Senator Walsh believed the 
President should be given firm backing of Congress while Senator Fall 
was an ardent interventionist. 
The leadership in the Senate was not united and lacked cohesion. 
Whether stronger leadership could have gotten tne bill passed is, of 
course, a matter for conjecture; but except for the one tactical mis-
take made by Mr. Hitchcock, it is not believed a united leadersbio would 
have succeeded. The Republicans cooperated with the Denocrats and by 
normal standards the bill should have passed. However, conditions were 
not normal and the leadership possibly overlooked the tenacity of the 
LaFollette group. 
CONGRESSIONAL LE.iilll::ll.S OPPOSiNG THE BILL--HOUSE OJ<' ll.EPll.ESEiltATIVi>S 
When the armed merchant ship bill was voted on in tne House of 
Representatives, the results were overwhelmingly in favor of passage,l 
This might seem to indicate there was no coordinated opposition in the 
House but that was not the case. As was stated previously in tnis 
treatise, it is considered the vote to recommit taken just before the 
final vote on passage is a better indication of the true sentiment in 
the House than the final roll call. l'his vote was 125 yeas, 293 nays, 
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4691--yeas 403, nays 14, not voting 17. 
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with 16 not voting. Whi~e better than a two to one majority, it does 
not indicate the lack of opposition that one might believe existed by 
reference to the final vote. There were lll Representatives who changed 
their votes when it was made apparent that the bill was going to pass. 
The opposition to the bill was generally based in the Middle ;iest and 
Great Plains states with considerable support from the Rocky Mountains 
and Pacific Coast. All tne leaders in the group were from the Great 
Plains area. In general the issues of sectionalism, agricultural pres-
sure, ethnic pressure, and pacificism seemed to be the dominent factors 
affecting the leadership. 
'l'he opposition to President v\filson' s proposal was led by Repre-
sentative Henry S. Cooper of ~isconsin, a veteran of twelve successive 
terms in tne House of Representatives and the senior Republican in the 
House next to "Uncle Joe Cannon," former Speaker. Mr. Cooper considered 
the bill would give the war power of Congress to the President and be-
lieved the bill amounted to a declaration of war. He apparently con-
sidered the actions of the British in regard to tneir blockade to be 
equally as disadvantageous to illnerican rights and shipping as the German 
action. In general, he represented the sectional attitude of the large 
pro-German elements of his native state of Wisconsin. Among other an-
nouncements on March 1, he quoted Woodrow Wilson in a speech on the floor 
of the House: 
I am opposed to granting to a President more power to 
endanger the peace of the country than is already given him 
by tne Constitution. That a President has such power is the 
view of President Wilson himself in his book, Congressional 
Government, published in 188 5: "His (the Presldent' s) orily 
power of compelling compliance on the part of the Senate 
lies in his initiative in negotiations, which affords him a 
chance to get tne country into such scrapes, tnat -che Senate 
hesitates to bring about the apoearance of dishonor wnich 
would follow its refusal to ratify che rash promises or 
to support the indiscreet tnreats of the Department of 
State.l 
Aligned with J:lr. Coo:Jer in his leadership of tile opposition in the 
House of Representatives was Democrat Dorse:r W. Shackleford of !:lissouri. 
Mr. Shackleford, a veteran of nine successive terms in the House, was 
somewhat of a pacifist and believed tnat a strong war party existed in the 
United States. He was strongly opposed to war and believed the arming 
of the merchant ships would be an act of war. As a member of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, he nad tried unsuccessfully to a~end the 
legislation while in the Committee. In the debate in the House, he 
said: 
From the beginning in the European war until now there 
has been in this country a war party. It has demanded from 
the first that we should go into the European war on the 
side of the allies, to assist them in the spreading of the 
cause of democracy over the world as they express it. That 
party has been backed up by a sinister press wi1ich from the 
beginning until now has been clam ring for war. • • • those 
of us who may not favor going to war are denounced as 
traitors, as poltroons, as cowards.2 
Additional leaders in the House who aided Cooper and Shackleford in 
the fight against the arming proposal were: 
Philip P. Campbell, rlepublican, Kansas 
Perl D. Decker, Democrat, h'iissouri 
Charles s. Dillon, nepublican, South Dakota 
Henry T. Helgeson, Kepublican, North Dakota 
These gentlemen all represented the general attitudes of the areas from 
which elected to the Congress. In general they took the position of 
being pro-German and anti-British, isolationistic, not in favor of uphold-
lcongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4654. 
2rbid., p. 4642. 
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ing international law, and the belief that t11e proposal amounted to a 
declaration of war. All tne leaders of ti1e group came from tne same 
general area of the country and seemed to follow the same pattern in 
their ideas and expressions. 
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OPPOSING THE BILL--SENATE 
In the last analysis concerninr; leadersnio there is one question 
which does more than any other to show the results of that _Leadersnip. 
ri'his is the question, 11 'das it successful7 11 In the case of the filibuster 
there is only one answer--an unqualified yes. One may malign the motives 
of tne group, may call them traitors or ccny equally unsavory nanes but 
it is difficult to criticize the resourcefulness, trl8 inteliir;ence or tne 
effectiveness of this leadersnip. A great deal of the credit must, of 
course, go to the leader and organizer of· the filibuster, Senaoor La~'olletoe 
of Vfisconsin. He, more than any other, was responsible for tne success 
of this venture and, as was fitting, reaped the wnirlwinci of invective 
that followed. Next in line to "fighting Bob" must come George Norris 
of Nebraska. Senator Norris worked hand in glove with Lalollette to set 
up the filibuster and to keep it going when it started. 'l'nese two persons 
were the foremost and recognized leaders of the "little group of wilful 
men" who stood by their principles in spite of Presidential, Congressional, 
press, and public pressure. As Senators LaFollette and Norris have been 
discussed under the heading of strong personalities, it is not considered 
desirable to repeat tneir stands and positions taken. nather the remain-
der of the section will be devoted to tile other leaders who made consider-
able contributions to the filibuster. 
Senator William J. Stone of Jdissouri was tne best .K:no11m and most 
effective leader of tne opposition group in the Senate next to the two 
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primary leaders. Mr. Stone was chairman of the influential Committee on 
Foreign helations and introduced bill S 8322 into the Senate. Early 
indications were that he would foster tne bill and attempt to get it 
passed into law. Apparenoly, kr. Stone did considerable soul-searching 
and on lilarch 2, decided to actively oppose ti1e proposal to arm the 
merchant ships. The sponsorship of the bill was accordingly turned over 
to lvir. Hitchcock of Nebraska, the next senior Democrat on the Committee. 
On March 3, Senator Stone spoke for four hours against tne proposed 
legislation. He attacked it on the grounds that it e~as unconstitutional, 
that Congress was abdicating its authority and dodging its responsibili-
ties, that it would authorize the President to declare war, and that it 
would work to the advantage of war profiteers. He also, and I believe he 
was alone in this, feared the rise of British militarism if the Allies 
should win the war. Among other things in tnis long speecn, he quoted 
the entire Farewell Address oi' 'liashington. Several of Mr. Stone' s state-
ments are quoted: 
I believe tile bill to be not onlv violatoive of the 
Constitution--destructive of one of ot~ most important 
powers vested in tne Congress, the war making power--but 
tnat its passage would set a precedent froug~~t with future 
danger to our form of government and to public liberty ••• 
It is said that this power, if granted, woula not 
authorize the President to initiate v1ar; out I say it wou.Ld.l 
The action of Mr. Stone was one of the turning points in the Senate fight. 
He had considerable influence in the Senate. His defection strengthened 
the stand of the LaFollette group. 
Senator Albert B. Cummins was another of the leading lights in the 
defeat of the armed ship bill. Senator Cu~rrins had been Governor of Iowa 
lcongressional Hecord, 64-2, p. 4878. 
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for eight years and was serving his second term as United States Senator. 
ivir. Cununins apparently believed that Congress would be divestint; itself 
of its authority and granting too much power to the £'resident if the legis-
lation were to pass. He seemed to think that President •Vilson was assuming 
too much power and that he nad aspirations to be some sort of a dictator. 
In the Senate, he expressed himself as being opposed to "kaiserizing" the 
United States,l It might be mentioned that Senators Cummins and Stone made 
attempts to amend the armed ship bill when it still had a chance to pass. 
A transplanted Middle Westerner, Senator John D. liorks, of Califor-
nia, took a stand against tne bill and served as one of the leaders in the 
filibuster. While serving in the Senate from California, he had spent the 
first thirty-six years of his life in Indiana and seemed to have an isola-
tionistic attitude which is often associated with that section, Mr. Works 
did not believe the government should go to war or become in any way involved 
in any altercations for the rights of a few citizens.2 In addition, he, 
like some of the others of the filibustering group, seemed to believe 
that Congress would be abrogating some of its power to the President if 
the bill became law. Mr. l'lorks was particularly incensed at the "manifesto 
of the 75" and regarded it as a deed unbefitting the Senate. 
Among those who were heart and soul in the filibuster and actively 
supported it were tne follo~~ng: 
Vi'illiam F. Kirby, Democrat, Arkansas 
James K. Vardaman, Democrat, ii,ississippi 
llioses E. Clapp, Republican, l!Jinnesota 
Asle J. Gronna, Republican, North Dakota 
lCongressional Record, 64-2, p. 4912, 
2Ibid., P• 4997. 
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These gentlemen opposed the bill for various reasons, all of which have 
been covered. They might with the possible exception of li1r. Vardaman who 
was pretty much of a pacifist, be loosely considered somewhat pro-German, 
sectional, and reactionary in their conduct. 
DIFFJillENCES IN HOUSE Al~D SENA1'E AC'liOti 
It has often been said that while the House watches the purse, the 
Senate watches the President. The Senate is ctnrged with certain responsi-
bilities of examining and advising on foreign affairs by che Constitution 
which makes it necessary that aU treaties must be ratified by the Senate. 
The Senators take this responsibility seriously and are fully aware of 
their importance as individual solons. 'l'he tradition of liberal discussion 
and the more relaxed procedure permit Senators to tinker with proposed 
policy to the point of altering it beyond all recognition or nullifying 
it altogether. An interesting example of' this was tr1e Senate action on 
the Treaty of Versailles and tne League of Nations. By the ti1ae Senator 
Lodge had put all his conditions on it, it was so altered that it was 
unacceptable to President Wilson. This tradition has led the people of 
the United States to expect unusual or sensational developments from the 
Senate and they have not usually been disappointed. Thus one could say 
that the Senate action on the armed ship bill was in the tradition of that 
body. The armed ship filibuster became one of the most notorious of Senate 
filibusters. From the year 1865 to 1946, thirty-seven rnajor bills (exclu-
sive of appropriation bills) were beaten in the Senate in this manner.l 
With its large membership the House has neither the time nor place 
lB. M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle, p. 374. 
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for outstanding statesmen to prove their worth through long discussion. 
The chamber procedure is better mechanized a.'1d tne leaders can spot 
obstructionary tactics much earlier and take action to parry them. Not 
having Constitutional authority with regard to approving Presidential 
actions on foreign affairs, the House generally gives these actions prompt 
and favorable consideration. This has been particularly true in recent 
years and was certainly true regarding the ar,ned ship bill. Unanimous 
agreement to limit debate to three hours was obtained in the House in a 
matter of !lOurs, while in tne Senate it '.vas never obtained. This does 
not mean that the House did not regard the proposal as vitally important 
but rather emphasizes a difference in tradition and procedure. Had this 
been an appropriation bill, the House would have no douot perused it care-
fully and diligently and taken a great deal more "time. 
1'he lack of a cloture rule in the Senate, at this time, aideci the 
insurgent group. They were only limited by their physical strength to 
stand, and to talk. The House operating under a set of rules which 
provides for the limitation of general debate could prevent the condi-
tion under which the Administration leaders found tnemselves in the 
Senate. 
The biennial term of the Representatives is another difference be-
tween the House and Senate which probably affected the action on the armed 
ship bill. The Representatives know tnat they lilUSt face their constituents 
every two years and not every six years. Thus they are more apt to have 
their finger on the pulse of the general public anci to hesi"tate to go 
against what they think -che people favor. In general, the people of the 
United States were favorable to the bill as shown by the strong support 
given it by the various clubs, organizations, newspapers, and periodicals. 
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This, to a large degree, accounts for the large shift in votes from the 
motion to recommit to the vote to pass and get on the winning side. 
The size of the two chambers also influences their actions on 
legislation. The House, being over four times as large as the Senate, 
cannot permit the same falderal to go on or notning would get done. If 
it did the House might be rendered completely impotent to act as the 
Senate, in the last days of the 64th Congress. As the House represents 
the people rather than the states, tt1e large number of members from the 
highly populated East made favorable action more likely on the armed 
ship bill. This insured a sizeable majority for the proposal when it was 
introduced and prevented a large opposition block from the Great Plains 
area, which is sparsely settled and accordingly has few Representatives 
in the house. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In analyzing the political factors involved in the armed ship 
controversy, the only clear and distinct conclusion is that they are 
all related and inter-relat-ed. There were some, of course, that had 
greater influence than others although attempting to list them in any 
order of priority seems to be slightly foolhardy for anyone less than a 
political expert. However, I will express my opinion as to which had 
considerable effect and which had little effect. 
There can be little doubt that the elements of sectionalism, 
pressure groups, personality, and leadership played a leading part in 
the house and in the Senate. On the other hand the elements of political 
partizanship, ethnic groupings, isolationism, interventionism, and inter-
nationalism were less importan-,:, and in a few cases the total effect might 
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be even discounted. The lines were split generally on a sectional basis 
witn tne pressure groups being closely inter-re_Lated witn tr,eir respective 
sections. The strongest supoort for che bill came froJl the industrial 
East with its bankers, nrunit..ion makers, com.nerce, etc., with the important 
opposition coming from the agricultural Great Plains areas along lines 
which nave existed and probably vdll exist for many years. 
The personality faccor was also one of great Lnportance, parcicu-
larl;y in the Senate, when one thinks of riobert LaFollecte and George Norris. 
•'ithout these great individualists, and strong cnaracters, it is quice 
likely that the bill might have gotten Senate apnroval vii crt li c'~le ,,JC,re 
trouble than yras experienced in the House. 'l'he -",Grson.lli 1;y factor is also 
tied in with the important leadership consideration. 'l't1e superior leader-
snip in the House as well as the differences ln size, rules, tradition, 
etc., nad much to do with the outcome of tno stru;;gle in that chaJllber. 
'iirnile not meaning to discount these e:le111ents, it is not considered 
that the party issue or ethnic p;roupings l1ad a ;;rea.t influence upon the 
struggle. l'he same might be said of the desire to re,nain clear of Europe 
and the desire to take our nlace as a great, large, and i.nportant nation 
of the I'Wrld. '1'here were a few for i:ru!1ediate wc1r i·.,-iti1 Ger1nany anci a few 
for avoidance of war at an;y price in botn Houses of Congress at the time. 
While quite important in other pnases of World iiar I, ti1e opposing issues 
of isolationism and internationalism in the armed ship bill fight were 
relatively minor. 
The moral issue influenced a great many funericans and hence 
Congressmen. Under this facade were the twin elements of upholding 
international law and tne rights and honor of Americans. This issue was 
often interwoven with the more material and tangible factors and in some 
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ways provided a moral sheen to these factors. The Congressmen from the 
South were influenced more than those of ocher areas and accoun-cs in large 
measure for the very strong support that area gave to the bill. 
If called upon to name the most important ele:nent in the success 
of the bill in the house, I believe it would be the leadership of ti1e 
pro-Administration group under Mr. Flood, Closely following that factor 
would be the influence of pressure groups and sectionalism. In ti1e Sen-
ate, the most important factor in tne filibuster and defea"t of tne bill 
was the personality of the leaders. The success of the filibuster may 
be attributed to the strength and individualism of Senators LaFollette 
and Norris more than anything else. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONTROVERSY 
The defeat of tne armed ship bill was by no means accepted by the 
President or by the country as a whole. In a public staoement given out 
to the press on the evening of March 4, Wilson said: 
Although as a matter of fact the Nation and the 
representatives of the Nation stand back of the Executive 
with unprecedented unanimity and spirit, the impression 
made abroad will of course be that it is not so, and 
that other Governments may act as they please without 
fear that this Government can do anything at all. l~e 
cannot explain: the explanation is incredible. The 
Senate of the United States is the only legislative body 
in the world which cannot act when the majority is 
ready for action. A little group of wilful men, repre-
senting no opinion but their own, have rendered the 
great government of the United States helpless and con-
temptible. 
The remedy? There is but one remedy. The only 
remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so 
altered that it can act. '£he country can be relied upon 
to draw the moral, I believe the Senate can be relied 
on to supply the means of action and save the country 
from disaster.l 
The words of the President were mild however, compared to the 
editorial attacks of the newspapers of the nation, The little group of 
Senators were relentlessly polloried and condemned by abusive language. 
The New York World for instance denounced "the wretches in tne Senate, 
• envious, pusillanimous, or abandoned. 1'hey have denied their 
country's conscience and courage in order to make a Prussian holiday. 
, • • They are delinquents and dastards. 11 The New York Herald stated, 
"The President' s excoriation merely reflects tne sentiment of the people 
••• but it should be stronger. Senator rlobert LaFollette and others 
lR. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 
P• 435. 
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in an hour of grave national peril have given aid and comfort to Prussian-
ism. Fortunate will these men be if their names do not go down in history 
bracketed with that of Benedict Arnold. 11 The Utica Press said, "It is 
nothing short of a sin and a shame. Those wno occasion delay deserve 
the denunciation to be hurled at them from every quarter of the United 
States." The Providence Journal declared the tactics of the filibuster 
group "were little short of treason." The liartford Courant said they 
were a "few political tramps. 11 'l'he Pittsburgh Dispatch deplored "this 
humiliating national spectacle. 11 The Memphis Co:11nercial appeal declared, 
"The American Republic is jeopardized ••• the iiberty of American peo-
ple is betrayed. • • • Our Kaiserbund is already formed with these 
Senators as leaders. 11 While the St. Louis Globe-Democrat called Senator 
Stone, "the shame of the country and particularly of the State he so 
unworthily represents." The press, almost without exception, demanded 
a revision of the Senate rules to prevent such a thwarting of the will 
of the ;najori ty in the future .1 The Outlook magazine ran an article in 
the March 14 issue entitled, "The Disloyal Senators," which states: 
To withstand this will of the majority in Congress 
was to do the will of Germany. By tnwarting the will of 
the majority, the Senators who prevented a vote on the 
bill authorizing the President to arm American merchant 
ships became Germany' s tools and allies. 'l'ney nave humili-
ated us before the world. They have violated the unwritten 
laws of all reputable deliberative assemblies. They have 
been disloyal to their country at a time of illL'llinent peril. 
'l'hey should never again be intrusted by the american peo-
ple with public office.2 
The above excerpts indicate now far the tide of public opinion had 
risen since the election of ti1e previous November. Notice Vias served to 
lThe New York Times, March 5, 1917, printed a number of comments 
presumea-fo-o8 representative of the press of the country. 
2The Outlook Magazine, Marcn 14, 1917, p. 1+51. 
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the recalcitrant Senators to conform to tne majority. Any Senator look-
ing to his political future would not mistake the warning. The legis-
latures of the country began to :aake themselves heard in resolutions, 
tnreats of discipline, and censure. Oregonians demanded the resignation 
of Senator Lane, "Oregon's traitorJ' and recall proceeaings were put into 
motion. 'fhe legislatures of many states moved to condemn the tactics 
of the filibusterers, among them being Coloracio, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. From all over tne country came 
such a wave of denunciation that the recalci·crant Senators began to back 
dovm. :Many minimized their part in tne fili-ouster, calj_ing attention to 
the fact that tney spoke only so many minutes a~~ainst tl,e biil. Senators 
Stone and La.F'ollette, alone, did not illciKe any excuses and st.ood adamant 
against the storm.l 
On the evening of March 5, a mass meetinr; of J,OJO citizens gathered 
in Carnegie Hall in New York City and pledged unqualified support to the 
fresident. •lhen the speakers referred to tne twelve Senators who thvrarted 
the will of the executive, shouts of "traitors" and "hang them" greeted 
their na:cnes. riesolutions ·were adopted condenming t-he "pacifist dena tors 11 
in unmeasured terms. 'fhat salfle evening Senator LaFollette was hanged in 
effigy by students of the University of lllinois. Prominent men among 
the clergy found a place in their sermons to excoriate pacifists in gen-
eral and filibustering Senators in particular. 
LIMITED CLOTURE GO.IIES TO THE SENATE 
President Vhlson in his speech on the evening of tne adjourmnent 
of Congress had vehemently demanded that the Senate ~rovide so~e sort of 
l~ York Times, March 6-10, 1917. 
limitation of debate on crucial legislation. Ee pointed out the number 
of bills such as the Army appropriation, the shipping board legislation, 
the conservation bill, and many others had been prevented from being 
passed by the filibuster in addition to the armed ship bill. 'l'he }resi-
dent was not alone in this as the nation's press and many prominent 
leaders loudly demanded that some sort of cloture come to tile Senate. 
The Sixty-fifth Congress, the Senate oi' which convened in special 
session at noon on the fifth of March, was to become one of the most 
important of bodies that ever sat in Washington and was to witness some 
of the most acrimonious debates ever heard in the halls of Congress. 
At this time several of the filibustering group, among them being Sena-
tors Gronna and Kenyon, protested against tne implication that they had 
filibustered the armed ship bill to death. Senator Lodge introduced on 
the sixth of March a new armed ship bill to give the }resident power to 
supply arms to merchant ships.l This bill was practically identical with 
the bill which had been so lately defeated and was sent to tne Co~~ttee 
on Foreign Relations where it was to remain, 'rne.re seemed little need 
to rush tnis bill through as the House was not in session and would not 
be until April second. 
Senator lviartin of Virginia, the Senate lVajority Leader, on lvlarch 7, 
introduced a resolution on linuting debate in the Senate. Senator 
LaFollette spoke long and vehemently against tne resolution and declared 
that the hysteria of the moment v.as driving Senators to do what they would 
normally resist with all their hearts,2 The Senate acted promptly on 
lcongressional Record, 65-Special, p. 20. 
2lbid., p. 41. 
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the issue and the resolution was adopted by a vote of 76 to 3. 'those voting 
against were LaFollette, Gronna, ana Sherman. T!1e Literary Digest described 
the cloture as follows: 
On March eighth, the Senate, by a vote of 73-3, 
surrendered its priviledge of unlimited debate, which 
it had defended against all assaults for more than 100 
years, and adopted a closure rule whereby, on a vote 
of two-thirds of the members, debate can be limited to 
a maximum of ninety-six hours, or one hour for each 
Senator.l 
THE SniPS iuili ililiili>D BY hll!:SIDENTIAL PROCLAiAA'l'lON 
President Wilson by his earlier writings and his address to Congress 
on the arming of merchant ships believed that he had constitutional power 
to place the arms upon these ships. It was now apparent tnat quick action 
could not be taken by Congress and the thing to do appeared to be to arm 
them by proclamation. The only restriction apoeared to be the old "pirate 
law of 1519. 11 
This law prohibited the President from permitting any merchant vessel 
of American registry to use force against the ships of a nation with which 
the United States was not officially at war. This law specified that 
armed merchant vessels should not use their guns against national vessels 
of a government with wnich the United States was in amity.2 
There was much discussion of the Presidential power at this time. 
The Outlook magazine claimed that the Presideno had this right and could 
authorize the ships to be armed in the same manner as private citizens 
in a city can be allowed to carry revolvers.3 the New Republic called 
lLiterary Digest, March 17, 1917, p. 96. 
2New York Times, Current History i;lagazine, p. 55. 
3The Outlook, ~larch 14, 1917, p. 445. 
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the law a "moth eaten barrier" to the Presidential powers,l The Indepen-
dent argued that the statute applied to the recognized rignt of visit and 
search, but did not apply to unlawful attempts to sink mercnant ships 
without warning, that since we had broken relations with Germany the two 
nations were not in amity, lt also asserted that Germany, as a foreign 
power, could not claim benefits of domestic legislation of this country 
except where principles of international law were involved,2 
President iiilson was urged to take tne step by Secretary of State, 
Robert Lansing. He was assured by Attorney-General Gregory tnat he had 
the legal authority althougll he had previous.Ly declared and believed tnat 
he had this power. The arming of the merchant shins by Presidential 
proclamation was forecast by Presidential Secretary Joseph 1'urnulty on 
March 9, when he said the President would have an important message in 
regard to the arming of American merchant ships in a few days, Accordingly 
on March 12, President iiilson gave the following notice to the press: 
The Department of State has sent today tne following 
state!Ilent to all foreign missions in ~Vashington for their 
information: 
In view of the announcement of the Imperial Government 
on January 31, 1917, that all ships, those of neutrals included, 
met within certain zones of the high seas, would be sunk 
without any precautions being taken for the safety of the 
persons on board, and without the exercise oi' visit and 
search, the Government of the United States has determined 
to place upon all American merchant vessels sailing 
through the barred areas, an armed guard for the protection 
of the vessels and tne lives of tne persons on board.3 
The President's action was well received in tne United States. 'l'ne 
people were excited and inflamed over the conduct of Germany and welcomed 
lNew Republic, March 3, 1917, p. 149. 
2The Independent, March 19, 1917, p. 482. 
3International Law Documents, Breaking of Diplomatic Relations, p. 16. 
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the attempt at armed neutrality. The press of' the country was almost 
unanimous in its support of the measure and said so in emblazoned headlines.1 
Congressmen supported the action and even those who claimed tne President 
did not have tne right to arm the ships without Congressional authority 
were silent. The few pacifists who claimed the matter would involve us 
in war were drowned out in the general clamor and acclaim for the action. 
THE ATTEMPT AT ARMED NEUTRALITY 
At the start of World viar r, the British nad armed some of their 
merchant ships as a protection against armed German surface raiders and 
German cruisers. As these arms were for defensive purposes and the 
American Government so notified, the American Secretary of State at tnis 
time (1Yl4) decided that such ships were to be treated as regular merchant-
men.2 The position of armed merchantmen as far as the United States was 
concerned remained essentially the sa.me during the entire war. Thus when 
President w·ilson led the United States in its attempt at "armed neutrality," 
the general ruling was that these ships should be treated as regular 
merchantmen in the accepted sense of' the word. 
There were some precidents on armed neutrality i'or the guidance 
of the United States on this venture. In 1730, the Hussiahs advanced 
the idea as a method of protecting commerce during the American IVar for 
Independence. The idea was supported by Denmark, bweden, Prussia, Austria, 
and Portugal. In 18()2, France and Spain recognized tne principle and 
Holland tried but was prevented by an English declaration oi' war. The 
lR. s. Baker, Woodrow Nilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 6, p. 499. 
2T. G. Frothingham, Armed Merchantmen, Current History Magazine, 
New York Times, p. 470. 
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demands of the League of Armed Neutrality were: 
1. Free passage of neutral ships from port to port and 
along coasts to combatants. 
2. Freedom of enemy goods in neutral ships except for 
contraband. 
3. A blockade to be lega1 must be effective.l 
In 1800, Russia again tried to form a lea~ue of armed neutrals to prevent 
British interference with shipping. Both these attempts had limited 
success. 'l'he history of the United States also shows an attempt to 
enforce international law by arming ships in 1798. At that time, mer-
chant ships were armed to prevent interference witn American shipping 
by Great Britain and France who were then at war. At the time of the 
United States attempo, Holland and Switzerland were practicing a form of 
armed neutrality. 'fnis was particularly effective in the case of 
Switzerland which was admirably located for this situation. 
It is problematical as to just what was President Nilson' s hope 
wnen he armed the merchant ships. It was an answer to Germany's unre-
stricted warfare and possibly the hope was that the Kaiser would modify 
his policies. The honor of the United States was also at stake and this 
was an important factor to a great many Americans including the President. 
The protection of American rights, commerce, and shipping were other 
important elements which armed neutrality might be expected to accomplish. 
The President also hoped that he might keep the United States from involve-
ment in the European War and possibly force a peace upon the belligerents. 
'l'here was little doubt that the policy would aid the Allies and work to 
the detriment of Germany. Had the merchant ships remained in American 
lw. L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 487. 
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harbors and refused to sail, the war effort of the AHies might have been 
seriously jeopardized. The President, it mi~ht be said, hoped for the 
best while fearing for the worst. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT' S ACTION 
The action of President Wilson in arming the American merchant ships 
without Congressional approval and authority has been discussed quite 
verbosely since liorld Viar I. He had asked for tne authority from Congress 
and had been prevented from receiving forraal approval by the filibuster 
by eleven intransigent members of the Senate. ~or all practical purposes 
it might be said that he had the approval after the House action and the 
presentation of the manifesto of the 75. In analyzing the President's 
action it rrught be interesting to review briefly tne record ~~d discuss 
some other possible courses of action. 
'l'he President at the opening of the great war nad asked the Alll8rican 
people to be neutral in thought as well as action. In Mav 10, 1914, he 
had exasperated many a.'llericans by his mild remonstrances and his "too 
proud to fight speech," after the Lusitania was sunk. Colone1 House had 
been sent to i!:urope on a peace mission in 1915 and hao remained there 
almost a year attempting to I1aj_t t~ne ~Yar madness. The oeace without vic-
tory campaign of late 1916 anci. early 1917 vmre manifestations of desire 
for peace and the hope to keep the United Stutes nvt oc:' Ti18 no1ocaust. 
In a speeci1 at Pittsburgh on January 2'}, 1916, he said: 
'rhere are two things which practically everybody who 
comes to t!1e Executive Office in l·~ashington tells me. Tney 
tell me, 11 'fhe peop1e are counting upon you to keep us out 
of war." And in the next breath wh>t do they tell, "'Ihe 
people are equally countlng upon you to maintain the honor 
of the United States • 11 nave you reflected tnat tne time 
may come when I could not do both?l 
lit. J. rlart1ett, The i1.ecord of American Diolomacy, p. ld19. 
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When the President armed the merchantships for the .futile try at armed 
neutrality, he was doing so with the overwhelming sup::ort and desires 
of the nation. ~he Literary Digest expressed it by saying that the 
President had nation-wide approval and acclaim for the act.l 
There was no other course of action for Mr. ~Vilson to take at the 
time. A possible early embargo o.f trade in arms and munitions such as 
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, S'weden, and Switzerland had 
imposed might have changed the situation. However, the cormoorcial in-
terests and the rising prosperity of the United States after a depres-
sion had eliminated any chance. of this early in the 'liar for reasons 
already discussed. Strict neutrality or cash and carry procedures might 
have prevented the action for armed neutrality, but it is quite doubtful. 
The lack of Allied shipping and the booming American prosperity together 
prevented any chance of this action. After the German unrestricted war-
fare announcement, which was practically an ultimatum to the United 
States, there was nothing else for the President to attempt but armed 
neutrality. 
Many revisionist writers, after the end of vwrld liar I, such as 
C. C. Tansill and H. E. Barnes have come up with many reasons for the 
involvement of the United States. The reasons offered are many and 
varied such as the munition makers, British propaganda, 'llall Street, 
and the arming of the merchant ships. In regard to tne last it can be 
said with more justification that it was the last attempt of the United 
States to escape involvement. For in the final analysis the decision 
that the United States should go to war was made in Germany, not in the 
United States. 
lLiterary Digest, March 24, 1917, p. 501. 
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